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Abstract
We study an investment experiment with a representative sample of Ger-
man households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset
whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental in-
vestments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit
desirable external validity at least in one respect: they predict real-life
stock market participation. But many households are unresponsive to
an exogenous increase in the risky asset’s return. The data analysis and
a series of additional laboratory experiments suggest that task complex-
ity decreases the responsiveness to incentives. Modifying the safe asset’s
return has a larger effect on behaviour than modifying the risky asset’s
return.
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1 Introduction
We report on an experiment that examines investment behavior in a represen-
tative sample of the German population. The experiment uses households from
the Socio-Economic Panel’s łInnovation Samplež (SOEP-IS) as respondents.
They act as investors who face a standard portfolio choice problem, allocating
a őxed budget between a safe and a risky asset. No other investments are
possible and the investment horizon is őxed. Despite its drastic simpliőcation,
the standard portfolio choice problem is widely viewed as capturing one of
the main tradeoffs in őnancial decision making. We regard its relevance as
an empirical question and examine both its internal consistency and external
validity for the German general population. Regarding external validity, be-
havior in our artefactual investment task is robustly correlated with actual
stock market participation, even after controlling for many of the correlates
of participation that the existing literature has identiőed. The average stock
market participation rate is 18% in our representative sample of households
and a one-standard-deviation increase in the experiment’s investment in the
risky asset is associated with an increase in stock market participation by 6
percentage points. Regarding internal consistency, we őnd that investments
in the risky asset are correlated with measures of beliefs about the asset’s re-
turn, lending credibility to the fundamental tenets of the standard portfolio
choice model. However, the data also shows severe limits of the rationality of
őnancial decisions. We exogenously vary the returns of the risky asset across
treatment groups, by paying some groups a őxed percentage over and above
(or below) the stock market return, and őnd that only a subsample of rela-
tively well-educated respondents reacts to such changes in incentives. For all
other respondents, the opportunity to earn additional money is lost.
Alongside this łartefactual őeld experimentž (in the sense of Harrison and
List (2004)), we also conduct a laboratory study in which we use the same pro-
tocol on a convenience sample of university students. The results are largely
congruent between the two settings, with one notable difference: unlike the
general population, university students do react to the variation in incen-
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tives. Given that experimental protocols were equivalent between the groups
of respondents, the difference in behaviorsÐbetween students versus SOEP
respondents, and between őnancially more versus less educatedÐpoints to the
role of cognitive factors.1
As a cautionary note, we point out that external validity in a speciőc set
of variables may not extend to others. We cannot check directly whether cog-
nitive factors inhibit reactions to changes in real-world investment incentives.
But the łbehavioralž pattern is pervasive. Not only do our data indicate a sys-
tematic deviation from theoretical predictions, but we also examine a speciőc
way in which the present task may present a cognitive challenge: the two as-
sets in the standard portfolio choice problem differ in nature, as the safe asset
is characterized by a single number whereas the risky asset is characterized
by a (subjective) probability distribution. An investor may őnd it easier to
appreciate a shift in the single number than in the probability distribution.
We test this new hypothesis in an additional laboratory experiment where
economically equivalent incentive shifts come in two guisesÐonce as a shift in
the return of the risky asset and once as a shift in the safe return. The experi-
mental design ensures that both incentive variations are presented in the same
format2 and that each participant faces both kinds of manipulations. The
experimental results conőrm that the reaction to changes in the safe asset is
signiőcantly stronger than the reaction to changes in the risky asset. This pat-
tern has not yet been observed in the literature, to our knowledge, and cannot
be explained by standard theories of decision-making under uncertainty.3 It
has potentially important implications for the optimal design of tax incentives
and other regulatory measures.
An alternative behavioural hypothesis, in contrast, receives only little sup-
1Not all variables show more “rational” patterns for the students: just as the SOEP
participants, they exhibit too mild a change in beliefs in response to incentive changes.
2The experiments involve incentive shifts for both assets, presented in equivalent ways.
A controlled variation of the shift sizes and a simultaneous variation of an illiquid asset
generates isomorphy within pairs of incentive shifts.
3One possible way of rationalizing the pattern is to posit that the manipulation of the
assets affects the perceived source of uncertainty (in the sense of Fox and Tversky (1995)
and Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2010)).
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port: we do not őnd systematic evidence that Germany’s low stock market
participation is related to pessimistic beliefs. Our elicitation of subjective be-
liefs results in subjective histograms, allowing us to check the accuracy of dif-
ferent moments of the subjective distributions. While the mean beliefs about
past DAX performance are about three percentage points less optimistic than
the actual mean of historical returns, the calibration of subjective distribu-
tions is remarkably good on average: in the vast majority of histogram bins,
the average of subjective probability mass allocated to the bin is very close to
the historical frequency (see Appendix A for detailed analyses).
Relation to existing literature. The observation that stock market participation
is puzzlingly low is widely credited to Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) who őnd
that not only do relatively few members of the middle class invest in stocks,
but even amongst the rich, where classical rationales for non-participation
are unlikely to hold, participation is far from universal. Germany is a strong
case for this puzzle, with its low percentage of stockholders. Behavioral ex-
planations of the puzzle are common in the literature4 and observational or
experimental őndings on őnancial literacy and subjective expectations abound
(see e.g. Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011).
A growing literature measures the general public’s beliefs about stock re-
turns. The earlier surveys asked for measure of central tendency only (Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2004) whereas entire distributions have subsequently been elicited5
The survey questions typically ask for statements about the probabilities of
market returns lying above given thresholds.6 The broad picture emerging
4Frequently mentioned explanations are education, cognitive skills (Grinblatt, Kelo-
harju, & Linnainmaa, 2011) and financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2007),
transaction cost and availability of information, and ambiguity aversion (Dimmock, Kouwen-
berg, Mitchell, & Peijnenburg, 2013).
5See the Survey of Economic Expectations (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the Michigan
Survey of Consumers (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the American Life Panel (Hurd & Ro-
hwedder, 2012), the French ‘Mode de vie des Français’ panel (Arrondel, Calvo-Pardo, &
Tas, 2012) and the Dutch CentER panel (Hurd, van Rooij, & Winter, 2011).
6E.g., in the Health and Retirement Survey respondents are asked for the chance that
mutual fund shares “will be worth more than they are today” and the chance that “they will
have grown by 10 percent or more” (Dominitz & Manski, 2007). Assuming no measurement
error these two questions yield two points on the CDF and, with distributional assumptions,
allow fitting an entire distribution.
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from this literature is that expectations are extremely heterogeneous, often lie
far away from actual returns (Hurd et al., 2011)7 and show positive predictive
power for stock market investments.
One drawback of these methods is that responses are often internally in-
consistent (Binswanger & Salm, 2013).8 Instead of asking for probabilities of
a return lying above a threshold, we use a histogram elicitation method pio-
neered by Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) in which respondents are asked
to distribute a probability mass of 1 into a number of bins. The method al-
lows using all available data instead of focusing on consistent sets of responses,
and has the advantage of being easy to understand; it has been successfully
used even with respondents with little formal education and low numerical and
statistical skills (Delavande, Giné, & McKenzie, 2011).9
In contrast to previous őndings, the respondents in our sample report be-
liefs that accurately capture the historical market return distribution, at least
in the aggregate (see Appendix A). A further notable difference is that while
experimental investments have high external validity in our sample, the elicited
beliefs have much less predictive power for stock market participation. This
may in part be due to the different parts of the sample which enter into the
econometric analysis. In Section 4, we report evidence that is consistent with
such sample selection. For respondents with a university degree, there does
exist a positive correlation between stock market beliefs and stock market
participation.10
7For example, Kézdi and Willis (2009) find that in 2002 the average subjective probabil-
ity of a stock market gain was just 49% compared to a historical frequency of 73%. Dominitz
and Manski (2011) report that from 2002 to 2004, the average subjective probability of a
gain was 46.4%.
8In the Health and Retirement Survey 41% of respondents give the same answer to both
the question about the likelihood of a positive return and the question about a return above
10%, and a further 15 % violate monotonicity.
9We additionally ask respondents for a simple numerical expectation, which yields very
similar results in most parts of the analysis.
10But there is further evidence suggestive of a systematic difference between the German
sample and others: the subjective probability of the relevant stock market index making a
gain varies significantly less between stockholders and non-stockholders in our data than it
does in the other studies. In each of Hurd et al. (2011), Dominitz and Manski (2011) and
Arrondel et al. (2012), the stockholders assign about ten percentage points more probability
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While there is a large literature on how people make risky choices11 and
on the relevant correlates,12 there are no existing studies that we know of that
examine whether risky choices in simple lab-style portfolio problems help to
predict stock holdings. But while our őnding of a strong correlation between
an experimental investment and real-life stock market participation is new,
the idea is not. In the working paper version of Dohmen et al. (2011) the
authors report on an investment experiment that was also done in a German
household survey but is simpler than ours. Dohmen et al. make the important
observation that domain-speciőc risk attitudes are better predictors of real-
world behavior than general risk attitudes. This is consistent with our őnding
that a choice framed in the context of őnancial markets is a better predictor
for real-life stock holdings than, for example, the respondents’ general risk
tolerance.
There is also a growing literature on how the complexity of the choice en-
vironment can produce suboptimal choices and muted reactions to changes in
incentives. Wilcox (1993) and Huck and Weizsäcker (1999) present laboratory
experiments showing that complexity of simple lotteries affects lottery choices.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) show that consumers react to the inclusion
of sales taxes on price tags even if the after-tax price of goods does not change.
Abeler and Jäger (2015) őnd much the same thing in a laboratory real-effort
task in which earnings are taxed either according to a straightforward schedule
or a more complex schedule. Though both schedules yield the same optimal
work effort in theory, subjects who face the complex schedule are further away
from the optimal solution. Moreover, and similar to our őndings, participants
with comparatively low cognitive abilities react less strongly to the imposition
of new tax rules under the complex schedule.13
mass to the event that the relevant index makes a gain. In our data, this probability differs
between stockholder and non-stockholders only by 2.3 percentage points.
11For evidence on choice patterns in representative samples, see, e.g. Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutström (2008), Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009), von Gaudecker, van Soest, and
Wengström (2011), Huck and Müller (2012) or Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman (2014).
12For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show with Dutch household panel
data how general trust correlates with stock holdings.
13We note that given the lack of response to stark variations in incentives that we observe
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the experimental design and procedures for both the household panel and the
laboratory. In Section 3 we focus on the experimental data and study the
relation between beliefs about returns and investments in the experiment. In
Section 4 we turn to the validity questions that relate the experimental data to
socioeconomic data from the household panel, and in Section 5 we examine the
treatment effects. Section 6 presents the additional experiment comparing the
return manipulation between safe and risky assets, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1 Survey module
Our experimental module was part of the 2012 wave of the German Socioe-
conomic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS). The SOEP is a nationally
representative sample of the German population and the SOEP-IS is its sister
survey which is used to try new questions and modules (see Richter & Schupp,
2012, for details). Its sampling of households follows the same procedure as
the SOEP does and renders the SOEP-IS representative of the German pop-
ulation. The module was presented to 1146 respondents in 700 households,
all of which were added to the SOEP-IS sample in 2012. All households com-
pleted the SOEP baseline questionnaire on the same day as our experimental
module. Trained interviewers collected responses via computer-aided personal
interviewing (CAPI) at the respondents’ homes. In the data analysis, we will
only use the responses from the łhead of householdž, whom we take to be the
household member who responds to the household questionnaire in addition
to the personal questionnaire that every household member answers.
Our module contains a regular survey component that we use to elicit
several aspects of respondents’ asset portfolio (liquid assets, debt, retirement
in our study, it is perhaps not surprising that investors do react to other, extraneous informa-
tion such as advertisements for individual stocks or photos of financial advisors (Bertrand,
Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zinman, 2010).
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savings) as well as őnancial literacy and attitudes towards savings and risk.14
The core component of the module is the interactive experiment modeled on
the standard portfolio choice problem that we describe in the following.1516
The őrst screen of our experiment shows respondents a summary descrip-
tion of the investment decision. They are asked to imagine owning e50,000
that they will invest for the duration of one year. The two available assets
are a safe asset that pays 4% and is framed as a German government bond,
and a risky asset, referred to as the łfundž. The fund is based on the DAX,
Germany’s prime blue chip stock market index. Respondents receive a one-
sentence description of the DAX and learn that, depending on the treatment,
the fund pays a return equal to a DAX return drawn from the historical dis-
tribution plus a percentage point shifter. There are őve treatments that differ
in the value of the shifter, with possible values in the set {−10,−5, 0, 5, 10}.
Respondents are randomly allocated to treatments. If their shifter value is 0,
then the shifter is not mentioned (for simplicity). Otherwise the őrst screen
indicates the absolute size of the shifter but not its sign. For example, a re-
spondent would learn that the fund pays either 5 percentage points less than
the DAX or 5 percentage points more than the DAX and that she will subse-
quently learn which of the two values applies. The respondents also learn that
they will be paid in cash on a smaller scale at the end of the survey.
On the second screen, respondents receive more detailed explanations about
the determination of payments including (in bold letters) the information of
the shifter’s sign that łthe computer has determined through a random drawž.
We use this two-step revelation of the shifter’s random draw in order to maxi-
mize the respondent’s appreciation that the shifter is random with zero mean,
14We use Dohmen et al. (2011)’s question, “How willing are you to take risks, in general?”,
on a scale from 0 to 10. In parts of our analysis we bin the responses into “Risk Tolerance:
Low” (response between 0 and 3), “Risk Tolerance: Medium” (4–7) and “Risk Tolerance:
High” (8 or above).
15In order to minimize interviewer influence, the CAPI-notebooks are placed in front of
the respondents and they themselves get to enter their responses. Interviewers are instructed
to intervene only if respondents show visible difficulties with the task or explicitly ask for
help.
16A complete set of instructions is available in the Supplementary Material.
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carrying no information about the underlying DAX return. Since each respon-
dent is only confronted with one realized shifter value in their choice problem,
showing the mirrored value makes it salient that the shifter carries no infor-
mation. The procedure also ensures that the instructions of the laboratory
replication are identical despite the fact that only two shifter values are pos-
sible there (see Section 2.2 below).
The text on the second screen also gives some numerical examples and
speciőes that the fund’s return depends on a draw from historical DAX returns
from 1951 to 2010 and that actual payments are scaled down by a factor of
2000.17
Upon reading these short instructions the respondents make their invest-
ment decision on the third screen. Respondents who invest their entire endow-
ment in the riskless asset would receive a certain payment of e26. Investing
the entirety in the risky asset could yield a payment anywhere from e11.52 to
e56.52 depending on the treatment and the randomly drawn year. No infor-
mation on historical returns is made available to the respondents during the
experiment. Under the assumptions of rational expectations, EU-CRRA and
usual degrees of risk aversion, one can generate the approximate prediction
that in treatments with non-negative shifters, all respondents with degree of
relative risk aversion below 3 should invest their entire endowment in the risky
asset; those with a shifter of -10 should invest very little whereas those with
-5 should invest intermediate amounts.18
17For all years since the DAX’s origination in 1988 we use the actual yearly returns on
the index. For all previous years we make use of the yearly return series from Stehle, Huber,
and Maier (1996) and Stehle, Wulff, and Richter (1999), who impute the index going back
all the way to 1948. All returns are nominal. In contrast to e.g. the S&P 500 the DAX
is a performance index, which means that dividend payments are included in the return
calculations.
18These statements hold in a classic two-period two-asset portfolio choice model with log-
normal asset returns and CRRA utility over wealth in the second period (i.e. a simplified
version of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969); see also Campbell and Viceira (2002)). In
this model the optimal stock investment share α can be approximated by
α =





where µr is the expected log return, σ
2
r is the variance of returns, rf is the natural logarithm
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On the fourth screen we elicit respondents’ beliefs about the return of the
fund, using the histogram elicitation method pioneered by Delavande and Ro-
hwedder (2008) and reőned by Delavande et al. (2011) and Rothschild (2012).19
A screenshot of the interface can be found in Appendix F. Respondents have
to place 20 łbricksž, each representing a probability mass of 5%, into seven
bins of possible percentage returns. The set of available bins is {(-90%,-
60%),(-60%,-30%),(-30%,0%),(0%,30%), (30%,60%),(60%,90%),(90%,120%)}.
The bins are, hence, wide enough to allow responses over the entire historical
support of DAX returns20 and, more generally, allow for a large set of possible
subjective beliefs. In addition, on the őfth screen, respondents enter the łav-
erage return [they] expect for the fundž. For both the histogram elicitation of
beliefs and for the stated beliefs, it is straightforward to formulate the rational
prediction of treatment differences: no matter the distribution of beliefs in the
population, the shifter should move beliefs one-to-one. For example, between
the -10 shifter and the +10 shifter treatments reported beliefs should differ by
20 percentage points.
Like all previous surveys on beliefs about stock market returns we decided
not to incentivize either of these belief measures. Properly incentivizing sub-
jects would have required a payment mechanism whose explanation would have
strained the attention span of our respondents (see Allen, 1987, for an example
of the risk-free rate and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Over the payoff-relevant
period 1951-2010 the log-normality assumption was approximately correct for year-on-year
returns on the DAX (Shapiro test p-value: 0.6), the mean log-return was 0.11 and the
variance of returns was 0.1. The riskless asset in the experiment paid 4%. The predictions
made in the main text readily result under rational expectations. For respondents with
log-utility (ρ ≈ 1) the optimal stock investment share in Treatment 0 is 1, in Treatment
-5 it is 0.74 and in Treatment -10 it is 0.22. Under the same assumptions positive shifters
have no effect on stock investment, which remains at the corner solution. However, given
that stock investments observed in reality are often much lower than those predicted by the
model and that most of the finance literature estimates risk aversion to be substantially
higher we decided to also include positive shifters.
19For an overview of studies which have used this or similar methods see Goldstein and
Rothschild (2014) and references therein.
20The lowest return on the DAX in the payoff-relevant period was -43.9% in 2002. The
highest return was 116.1% in 1951. The lowest bin was included for reasons of rough
symmetry and to keep subjects from anchoring their reports on the lowest possible return
displayed in the interface.
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of such a mechanism) and taken up valuable survey time for very little gain.21
On the sixth and seventh screens, respondents report how conődent they
are of their belief statements, on a scale from 0 (łnot at allž) to 10 (łvery
surež), and answer a few understanding questions. The eighth screen elicits the
respondents’ beliefs about next year’s DAX return using the same histogram
interface that was used before. Finally, on the ninth and last screen of the
experimental module respondents were told which of the years between 1951
and 2010 had been drawn and received a detailed calculation for their payment.
Respondents were paid in cash, with amounts rounded up to the nearest euro,
at the end of the entire survey interview. On average respondents received
e27.16 (min: e17, s.d.: e3.43, max: e48).22
Before respondents are presented with the experimental module and its in-
structions, they have a choice whether or not to participate. The participation
rate is 80%. Those who decline primarily cite old age and problems with using
computers but also a lack of interest in őnancial matters or ethical or religious
reservations against any sort of őnancial łgamblingž. The probit regression
shown in Table 1 mirrors these answers from the open-ended question about
the reasons for non-participation. The most potent predictor, indeed the only
signiőcant predictor, of selection into the experiment is age. Respondents over
the age of 40 are somewhat less likely to participate and respondents above the
age of 70 are signiőcantly less likely to participate though almost two thirds
in this age group still participate. All other observable characteristics play no
role in the selection into the experiment. A Wald-test for the joint signiőcance
of all variables other than the age brackets cannot reject the null of no effect
(χ2(18) = 19.41, p = 0.37).
21Both Armantier and Treich (2013) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) show that
the wrong scoring rule can induce bias in the responses. In contrast, not incentivizing the
elicitation of beliefs does not yield biased answers in these studies but merely noisier answers.
A further concern with incentives is the introduction of possible motives for attempted
hedging between tasks (see e.g. Karni & Safra, 1995).
22Had they invested the everything into the fund the average earning would have been
e28.88.
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Dependent variable: Participation in the Experiment
Female −0.001 (0.030)
Born in the GDR 0.028 (0.038)
Abitur 0.043 (0.058)
University Degree −0.001 (0.070)
Household Size −0.018 (0.019)
Number of Children in Household 0.019 (0.034)
Employed 0.017 (0.038)
Financially Literate 0.028 (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros −0.028 (0.035)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.027 (0.049)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.096 (0.093)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.120 (0.240)
Interest: refused to answer −0.076 (0.087)
Stock Market Participant 0.025 (0.046)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.029 (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.027 (0.041)
Age bracket 31-40 0.032 (0.077)
Age bracket 41-50 −0.083 (0.059)
Age bracket 51-60 −0.084 (0.057)
Age bracket 61-70 −0.064 (0.060)
Age bracket > 70 −0.200∗∗∗ (0.059)
N 692
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replicates
“Financially Literate” is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very
good” with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix H.
Table 1: Selection into the experiment: Probit marginal effects
2.2 Laboratory Experiment
Upon completion of the őeld data collection in the SOEP-IS, we used the iden-
tical experimental module for a set of 198 university students in the WZB-TU
Berlin decision laboratory. Recruitment into the laboratory sample followed
standard procedures.23 The instructions and sequence of informational dis-
plays on the computer screens in the laboratory were as close to the CAPI
environment as we could produce them, so that the potential practical dif-
őculties with the format would affect both populations. The experimental
23The decision laboratory uses ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
11
participants’ payments were also scaled by the same factor as payments to
SOEP participants. The only relevant difference in experimental design and
procedures are that (i) the experimental participants do not have to őll out
the long SOEP questionnaire, and (ii) we conducted only two treatments with
return shifters -10 and 10, in the laboratory, focusing on the strongest treat-
ment difference in incentives. Since the SOEP respondents who happened to
be in either of these two treatments were only informed about the existence
of these two treatments, we could leave the instructions entirely unchanged
between survey and lab environments.
3 Experimental Data
3.1 Beliefs and Investments
We start with a summary description of investments and elicited beliefs. We
call the share of wealth that a respondent invests in the fund łequity sharež
hereafter. In both samples the distributions of equity shares have relatively
wide supports and few people invest all or nothing. Summing over all treat-
ments, the means (and standard deviations in parentheses) of the equity share
are 0.37 (0.25) in the SOEP sample and 0.46 (0.31) in the laboratory sample.
The proportions of respondents investing all, exactly half, or nothing in the
risky asset are 0.03, 0.2 and 0.18 in the SOEP sample and 0.12, 0.05 and 0.09
in the laboratory sample.24
A description of the beliefs about the fund’s return is more involved, since
each belief report consists of an entire histogram. A clear difference between
the SOEP and the lab is that the laboratory participants use more bins than
the SOEP respondents.25 The median number of bins that contain at least
one brick is 6 in the laboratory while it is only 3 in the SOEP where 28% of
respondents use only a single bin and a further 14% only use two bins.26
24When we restrict the SOEP sample to the two extreme treatments that we also ran in
the lab the proportions are 0.05, 0.21 and 0.15.
25Appendix G contains examples of the raw data of elicited histograms from both samples.











Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D N
Overall 0.37 (0.25) 12.53 (20.59) 23.96 (16.54) 8.27 (17.84) 562
Age Bracket
<30 0.41 (0.27) 12.16 (16.06) 30.25 (16.07) 8.74 (16.64) 82
31-40 0.39 (0.22) 13.85 (15.73) 25.60 (17.13) 12.02 (16.54) 76
41-50 0.40 (0.23) 12.57 (24.70) 26.36 (16.75) 7.12 (18.65) 107
51-60 0.37 (0.26) 13.24 (21.86) 22.72 (16.46) 8.43 (19.41) 107
61-70 0.34 (0.26) 10.02 (19.63) 20.46 (15.88) 6.22 (17.27) 111
>70 0.32 (0.28) 14.13 (22.49) 19.19 (14.77) 8.36 (17.63) 79
Gender
female 0.35 (0.24) 9.72 (22.29) 25.60 (17.20) 7.86 (21.59) 271
male 0.39 (0.26) 15.14 (18.52) 22.43 (15.78) 8.65 (13.46) 291
Born in
West Germany 0.37 (0.26) 12.11 (20.97) 23.34 (15.60) 7.40 (17.38) 379
East Germany 0.34 (0.23) 12.87 (21.96) 22.47 (17.46) 7.75 (17.69) 116
abroad 0.42 (0.28) 14.95 (15.44) 29.74 (19.10) 14.66 (17.35) 54
Abitur
yes 0.37 (0.28) 10.74 (19.51) 26.70 (14.83) 6.40 (13.47) 122
no 0.37 (0.25) 13.02 (20.87) 23.20 (16.93) 8.78 (18.85) 440
University Education
yes 0.35 (0.28) 11.54 (21.78) 26.95 (15.40) 5.55 (16.46) 72
no 0.37 (0.25) 12.67 (20.42) 23.52 (16.67) 8.67 (18.01) 490
Employed
yes 0.39 (0.25) 13.64 (20.70) 24.38 (16.13) 8.98 (16.13) 297
no 0.35 (0.26) 11.27 (20.42) 23.49 (17.01) 7.47 (19.58) 265
Financially Literate
yes 0.36 (0.25) 14.13 (20.80) 24.02 (15.98) 8.08 (17.68) 283
no 0.38 (0.26) 11.05 (20.27) 24.00 (17.14) 8.47 (18.09) 277
Stock Owner
yes 0.45 (0.29) 12.79 (18.20) 22.66 (14.55) 8.95 (13.82) 107
no 0.35 (0.24) 12.50 (21.13) 24.29 (16.99) 8.11 (18.69) 454
“Financially Literate” is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very
good” with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix H.
Table 2: Experimental Responses in the SOEP by subgroup
on the low side. Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) report that 73% of their subjects used
two or fewer bins. 13
In the analysis below we repeatedly use summary statistics that we com-
pute from the reported histograms. Using the stated point beliefs would pro-
duce similar results in most instances, and we will often present the results
of both measures, pointing out the differences where they arise. To compute
statistics like the expectation or the standard deviation of returns from the
histograms, we take the 8 points on the CDF, interpolate between them using
a cubic spline and then calculate the statistics numerically.27 Using these im-
puted distributions, we őnd that the average of the SOEP respondents’ mean
expected return of the fund is 12.5% and the average standard deviation of
the fund’s return distribution is 20.6%. For the laboratory sample, the aver-
age mean belief about the fund’s return is 11.6% and the average standard
deviation is 35.6%.
As described in the previous section, we also elicited scalar belief reports by
asking for the łexpectedž fund return. In the SOEP sample, this variable has a
mean of 8.3% and a standard deviation of 17.8%. In the laboratory sample, the
mean is 11.0% and the standard deviation is 19.1%. Stated expectations are
highly correlated with expectations inferred from belief distributions (Spear-
man correlation coefficient: 0.43 for the SOEP and 0.47 for the lab sample).
Table 2 collects key descriptives for the main experimental variables for differ-
ent subgroups of the SOEP sample (a similar table for the lab sample is omitted
because the student population is very demographically homogeneous). The
table shows some but not many differences between subgroups. Respondents
who are succesful in our őnancial literacy tests invest, surprisingly, the same
average amount in the artiőcial stock market. Real-world stock owners, how-
ever, invest signiőcantly more in it and show only slightly more optimistic
beliefs (see also Section 4).
We now investigate the extent to which equity share and beliefs are corre-
lated. Figure 1 contains a scatter plot of equity shares and the belief measures
for both the SOEP and the lab sample. The őgure shows pronounced posi-
tive relationships between belief and investment overall. At the mean of the
27This method is due to Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (2012). A more detailed
description of the interpolation procedure can be found in Appendix F.
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data an increase in the expected return by one percentage point is associated
with a one third percentage point increase in the equity share (see Table A3
in the Appendix for OLS regressions). This relationship holds for both our
belief measures and is roughly the same in the laboratory. This evidence of a
positive association between beliefs and investments is consistent with many
studies in the belief elicitation literature (see, for example, Naef and Schupp
(2009) and Costa-Gomes, Huck, and Weizsäcker (2014) in the context of trust
games).
As decribed earlier, investments are incentivised but beliefs are not. This
may affect the precision of stating beliefs and thus our measurement of cor-
relates of beliefs and investment. To account for such possible effects, Ap-
pendix D provides a detailed subsample analysis for subgroups of different de-
grees of measurement error. The analysis shows that the results presented in
the main text are robust to these subgroup restrictions, unless otherwise noted
in the main text. We again note that simple models of portfolio choice, see
for instance footnote 18, would predict a stronger relationship between beliefs
and investments, which is not surprising given that they leave out important
factors of the decision process. But given the robustness of our subgroup anal-





























































Overlapping observations are aggregated, with the dot’s size being proportional to the number of observations thus aggre-
gated. Model fit comes from a polynomial regression in which investments are a cubic function of expected return (Models
2, 5, 8 and 10 in Table A3 in the Appendix, which also contains alternative specification that e.g. control for personal
characteristics but all show results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.). 95% confidence interval in light gray.
Figure 1: Equity Share and Beliefs
Notice that also in other ways, the data show patterns that are hard to
square with the predictions of the standard model. As in Merkle and Weber
(2014), there is a substantial fraction of participants who expect a negative
excess return for the experimental asset and yet invest positive amounts. But
altogether, the strong statistical connection between belief data and invest-
ment decisions can be regarded as supporting the basic implication of the
standard portfolio choice model: higher expected returns occur together with
larger investments.
4 External validity: Stock market participation
We now ask which of our response variables are correlated with real-life in-





1st 2nd 3th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Household Income 7% 7% 3% 21% 14% 17% 20% 19% 26% 46%
Liquid Wealth 0% 2% 2% 2% 5% 13% 11% 39% 43% 56%
Table 3: Stock-market participation rate by income and wealth deciles
elicited behavior in the experiment with survey responses to the question łDo
you own any stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible bonds?ž
18% of all households answered this question in the affirmative, which is in
line with other evidence on the German stock market participation.28 Splitting
the participation rate by deciles of both household income and a proxy for
liquid wealth,29 Table 3 also shows that stock market participation increases
in both variables but stays well below 100%.
Figure 2 displays a correlogram, a visualization of the correlation matrix for
several survey and experimental variables. Starting from the vertical, positive
correlations are displayed as wedges that are shaded clockwise while negative
correlations are shaded counter-clockwise. The higher the correlation, the
larger the wedge and the darker the shade of the wedge.
The correlogram shows that only a handful of variables are reliable corre-
lates of stock market participation. Most of the signiőcant correlations have
been observed in the previous literature. For example, household size is known
to be a signiőcant predictor of stock market holdings. Likewise, household in-
come and AbiturÐthe highest form of secondary education in Germany and
the only form that grants access to the university systemÐare well-known
and entirely unsurprising correlates of stock ownership. Notably in our data,
equity share is the only experimental variable that is signiőcantly correlated
28Most other surveys provide numbers only for the percentage of individuals who hold
stocks. In our data this percentage stands at 15.4% (S.E.: 1.1%) while a 2012 survey by
Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2012) puts it at 13.7%.
29The SOEP question about interest earned on investments over the previous year is
answered by far more people than more detailed questions about the amounts of wealth held
in the form of various assets. We therefore use this variable as a proxy for liquid wealth.
The alternative measure, the sum over all asset classes, yields broadly similar results. For


















The correlogram above visualizes the pairwise (Pearson) correlation coefficients of the variables.
E(DAX) is the imputed expected return on the DAX going forward while SD(DAX) is the imputed standard deviation of
the reported return distribution. P(DAX>0) is the reported probability that the DAX will make a gain over the next year.
Figure 2: Correlogram
with stock holdings (correlation: 0.14, p-value: < 0.001), an observation that
is consistent with the hypothesis that the standard portfolio choice problem
captures essential aspects of stock market participation, but which could also
stem from spill-overs from real-life decisions into the experiment. The elicited
beliefs, in contrast, show only weak correlations with stock ownership. Only
when interacting with university-degree status (as a proxy of numerical liter-
acy) do we őnd a signiőcant coefficient of belief, for those respondents with
a university degree.30 Of course, from a theory stand point there may be no
30The size of the results depends on whether we use the stated point belief or the average
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strong reason for beliefs about the past to impact on current stock holdings.31
The correlograms only show bivariate relations. In order to gain a broader
picture we investigate whether the correlations change if we control for other
variables. We őnd that equity share has explanatory power over and above the
other variables, see Table 4. Even after including all relevant controls, which
drives up the R2 to around 30%, the coefficient for equity share remains both
economically important and statistically signiőcant and is robust to different
speciőcations. Back-of-the-envelope calculations yield the result mentioned in
the introduction, that an increase in equity share by one standard deviation
is associated with an increase in stock market participation of six percentage
points.32
The fact that equity share helps to explain stock holdings even if we control
for all other variables that are known to be good predictors of stock market
participation is important for two reasons. First, it establishes external valid-
ity. Investment behavior in the experiment is strongly related to investment
behavior outside of the experiment. Second, the result gives hope that the
simple experimental portfolio choice problem can be used as a simple piloting
device: it allows the controlled manipulation of a behavioral variable that has
a close connection to stock market particpation, both in terms of economic
theory and in terms of empirical correlation. Hence, there is hope that inter-
ventions, for example, to encourage stock ownership, could be pre-tested in
laboratory or artefactual őeld experiments such as ours.
“imputed” belief from the respondent’s histograms. A unit standard deviation increase in
the stated expectation about the fund is associated with a stock ownership increase of 11
percentage points (p=0.001, one-sided t-test) while a unit standard deviation increase in
the imputed expectation about the fund is associated with a stock ownership increase of 6
percentage points (p=0.11).
31The results of this section are robust against replacing backward looking beliefs by
forward beliefs about the development of the DAX in the next twelve months. A notable
(reasonable) difference is that forward looking beliefs are less strongly correlated with equity
share, for which backward looking beliefs are more relevant.
32Appendix D shows that also for respondents who show low measurement error equity
share predicts stock ownership better than expectations predicts stock ownership.
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Dependent variable: Stock Market Participant
(1) (2) (3)












University Degree 0.049 −0.003
(0.078) (0.072)
Household Size 0.039∗∗ −0.004
(0.019) (0.022)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.020 0.034
(0.037) (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.008 0.058
(0.044) (0.043)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Imputed S.D. of DAX −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX −0.003 0.039
(0.088) (0.085)




Financially Literate 0.140∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗
(0.033)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗
(0.057)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗
(0.086)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗
(0.110)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150
(0.100)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023
(0.018)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗
(0.084)
Constant 0.110∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.130
(0.029) (0.140) (0.140)
N 561 560 560
R2 0.021 0.150 0.280
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.130 0.250
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Household income is in thousands of Euros
Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases). Moreover, a dummy variable is added to the regression which is
1 for the observations with missing household income.
Table 4: Predicting real-world stock-market participation
20
5 Treatment effects
Recall that we implement őve exogenous treatments that shift the historical
return of the DAX. The shifts are sizable, ranging from -10 percentage points
to +10 percentage points. Table 5 documents that, by and large, there is
no sizable effect of the return shifter on equity share in the SOEP sample
(see also Online Appendix G showing histograms of equity shares in the dif-
ferent treatments). The lack of response can hardly be explained by small
incentives. In terms of the nominal framing of the e50,000 investment, the
difference in returns between Treatments -10 and 10 amounts to a difference
in returns of up to e10,000. In terms of the real monetary value of the ex-
perimental investment, the variation in return amounts to a difference of up
to e5. This difference is large enough for the typical participant in an exper-
iment (even in representative samples) to react. The overall lack of response
therefore suggests that many respondents őnd it difficult to incorporate the
shift appropriately in their investment choice.
However, this result is not universal. Instead Table 5 shows an important
difference between the SOEP and the laboratory sample. While SOEP partici-
pants appear to ignore the shifter on average, there is a strong and statistically
signiőcant reaction of investments to the treatment in the laboratory. There,
the equity share rises from 0.30 to 0.63 in response to improving the return of
the fund by 20 percentage points.
Similar results hold for those parts of the SOEP sample that are plausibly
more őnancially savvy, those who are more educated, those who have more
liquid assets (or refuse to answer the question about how much interest they
obtain from liquid assets) and those who answer the standard őnancial liter-
acy question about compound interest correctly. Hence, it appears that the
main difference between SOEP and lab is driven by selection on educational
covariates and wealth.33
The beliefs about the fund’s return, however, do not respond to the shifter
in the way they should, no matter what measure of beliefs we use and no matter
33For details of differences between subsamples, see Appendix C.
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Setting Variable -10 -5 0 5 10 ANOVA Kruskall-Wallis
SOEP Equity Share 0.40 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.32 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.106 0.135
Imputed Beliefs 13.14 (1.97) 10.58 (1.81) 9.38 (1.85) 14.48 (1.83) 14.45 (2.18) 0.232 0.326
Stated Beliefs 8.55 (1.71) 7.68 (1.70) 6.60 (1.98) 9.28 (1.43) 8.93 (1.66) 0.810 0.990
Probability of a Gain 0.68 (0.03) 0.67 (0.03) 0.67 (0.03) 0.74 (0.02) 0.69 (0.03) 0.323 0.313
Lab Equity Share 0.30 (0.03) 0.63 (0.03) 0.000 0.000
Imputed Beliefs 10.05 (1.71) 13.37 (1.57) 0.156 0.016
Stated Beliefs 9.87 (2.28) 12.30 (1.38) 0.374 0.004
Probability of a Gain 0.59 (0.02) 0.65 (0.01) 0.029 0.009
Table 5: Mean levels by treatment
whether we consider the SOEP data or the laboratory data. While there is
a statistically signiőcant effect in the laboratory sample, it is much smaller
than the 20 percentage points predicted by probabilistic sophistication, and
there is no effect at all in the SOEP sample. In both samples and regardless of
whether we consider imputed beliefs or stated beliefs, we can strongly reject
the rational prediction that the shifter moves the mean of beliefs one-to-one.
We tentatively conclude from this evidence that human decision makers,
despite judging the risky return distribution well, cannot deal with manipula-
tions of it well. As we show in Appendix A, subjects’ beliefs about past DAX
returns are surprisingly accurate. Within each of the seven histogram bins,
the population-average belief of DAX returns falling in the bin is within just
few percentage points of the historical frequency. But the beliefs do not react
strongly enough to the experimental manipulation. This also raises the ques-
tion how well the respondents understand the manipulation, despite our long
and intense efforts for clarity in the instructions. The next section investigates
the possibility that the weak reaction to the manipuation may be driven by
factors beyond the understanding of the experimental instructions.
6 Asset Complexity and Reactions to Changes
in Incentives
6.1 Experimental Design
In this section, we investigate the role of complexity with an additional labora-
tory experiment. We introduce manipulations of both the risky asset and the
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safe asset that are economically equivalent and described in identical terms. To
make the two shifts economically equivalent, we modify the decision maker’s
exogenous income level.34
The design follows the same format as the paper’s main experiment, imple-
menting the standard portfolio choice problem. In the new experiment (i) each
participant makes eight investment decisions, allowing a within-subject anal-
ysis, and (ii) each participant receives a task-speciőc őxed income in addition
to the earnings from the portfolio choice.
The participants are endowed with an illiquid asset that generates the őxed
income WI , and with liquid wealth WL that they can allocate among a safe
asset and a risky asset. The risky asset pays a rate of return r whereas the
safe asset pays a rate of return rf .
Now consider an increase in the risky return r by an amount ∆, analogous
to the exogenous return manipulation of the paper’s main experiment. Under
this manipulation, a decision maker who invests α in the risky asset earns a
random payoff given by:
pi(α) = αWL(1 + r +∆) + (1− α)WL(1 + rf ) +WI
For a framing variation of this manipulation by ∆, we can alternatively
induce a simultaneous shift in rf by amount −∆ and in WI by amount ∆WL,
yielding the same payoff from investing a share α in the risky asset:
pi(α) = αWL(1 + r) + (1− α)WL(1 + rf −∆) + (WI +∆WL)
From the fact that pi(α) is identical between both treatments and for all α,
we conclude that the same risks are available between the two manipulations.
Consequently, expected utility theory, and any other theory that employs a
stable mapping from a constant set of uncertainty states into the risky asset’s
return rate, predict an identical choice by the decision maker. The same
34Two remarks are in order. First, we designed this section’s experiment after we observed
the results from the experiments described in Section 2.2—hence the separate presentation.
Second, the fact that we could run the complexity experiment only in a laboratory format
also means that we cannot investigate the present research question for the subsamples that
show the weakest reaction to incentive shifts. We suspect, but have no proof, that these
subsamples would exhibit even larger differences in their reactions to different shifts.
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statement is true if both the safe and the risky assets’ returns are additionally
shifted by a constant amount∆′. The experiment’s null hypothesis is thus that
participants react equally between the equivalent manipulations of incentives
applying to the safe asset or the risky asset.
To ensure that the results are not driven by an asymmetry between positive
shifts and negative shifts, we formulate the entire experiment such that only
positive shifts occur. This is achieved by adding an appropriate return shift ∆′
to both assets.35 The parameters for the eight choice problems are displayed
in Table 6. The collection of equivalent variations is the following: Problems 1
and 3 are economically equivalent, Problems 2 and 4 are economically equiv-
alent, Problems 5 and 7 are economically equivalent, and Problems 6 and 8
are economically equivalent. Problems 1 and 2 differ only in the risky asset’s
return; Problems 3 and 4 differ in the shifter applied to the riskless asset (and
a compensatory change in the illiquid endowment), in the described way. But
the difference in incentives is the same between 1 and 2 as between 3 and 4.
Thus, expected utility and most of its generalizations predict that the differ-
ence in investments is identical. Analogously, the difference between 5 and 6
is predicted to be identical to the difference in investments between 7 and 8.
As described above, our main hypothesis in this experiment is that shifts in
safe return generate a stronger reaction: investments may differ more between
3 and 4 than between 1 and 2, and more between 7 and 8 than between 5 and
6.
76 participants were recruited into 4 experimental sessions at WZB-TU
Berlin laboratory in the spring of 2014, using identical procedures as in the
study described in Section 2.2. Similar to the őrst lab study we take a őxed-
35We also ran three pilot sessions but do not use the data gathered in these sessions here.
In the first pilot session subjects were presented with both “bonuses” and “fees” on the two
assets and displayed aversive reactions to any asset to which a fee was applied. Since the
effect of gain/loss framing was not the subject of this study we therefore ran two sessions
with bonuses only but found that up to 42% of subjects chose investments at the lower
boundary of the budget set. Since this much truncation presents problems both in terms of
power and in terms of the distributional assumptions one is required to make to deal with
it, we therefore changed the magnitude of the bonuses to arrive at the valued reported here,
values that yield much fewer truncated responses. Note, however, that the responses in all
pilots were also indicative of stronger reactions to changes in the safe asset.
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Treatment Bonus on Bonus on Illiquid Liquid
Risky Asset Riskless Asset Endowment Endowment
1 9.00 5.90 16000 50000
2 2.65 5.90 16000 50000
3 5.90 2.80 17550 50000
4 5.90 9.15 14375 50000
5 9.10 6.05 14275 50000
6 3.10 6.05 17275 50000
7 6.05 3.00 15800 50000
8 6.05 9.00 15800 50000
Table 6: Treatment parameters
interest German government bond (here, yielding 2 % per annum) as the safe
asset and the return on the DAX in a year randomly drawn from 1951 to
2010 as the risky asset. Treatments were presented in random order so as
to avoid confounds from learning or contrast effects. One of the eight tasks
was randomly selected and paid out at the end of the experiment, ensuring
incentive compatibility for each task.
6.2 Results
Figure 3 displays the differences in average equity shares (the percentage of the
liquid endowment invested in the risky asset) for each of the four treatment
pairs. A weaker reaction to changes in the risky asset return is immediately
visible. Treatments 1 and 2 vary the risky asset return by 6.35 percentage
points while holding the riskless asset return constant. This causes a change
in mean equity share from 0.28 when the bonus on the risky asset is 2.65
percentage points to 0.62 when the bonus on the risky asset is 9 percentage
points, for a difference of 0.34. A change of equal magnitude in the return of
the riskless asset causes a larger change in the equity share. While the mean
equity share in treatment 3 is 0.61, almost identical to that in treatment 1, the
mean equity share in treatment 4 is 0.21, lower than that in treatment 2. This
































Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3: Investments in the risky asset by treatment
treatments 5 to 8.36
Given the comparatively small sample size, each of these mean responses
is subject to considerable sampling error. In order to formally test our main
hypothesis we pool the data from all treatments. We compute the difference
in differences for treatments 1 to 4 and add to this the difference in differences
for treatments 5 to 8. Under the null of rational, equal-sized responses to
changes in either the risky and riskless asset returns this sum should be zero.
Instead, we őnd it to be 0.10, positive and statistically signiőcantly so (one-
sided Wilcoxon rank sum test p-value = 0.014, one-sided t-test p-value =
0.047).37
36A graph of the raw responses is available in Appendix L.
37Over all treatments about 11% of responses are truncated below at zero. The percentage
of truncated responses is higher in treatments 4 and 8 than it is in treatments 2 and 6. The
truncation therefore potentially obscures larger differences between treatments 3 and 4, and
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In all, it appears that changes in the riskless asset are easier to process (or
understand) which may have important implications for all sorts of economic
decision problems.
7 Conclusion
The paper at hand describes a simple portfolio choice problem with one safe
and one risky asset, implemented in an artefactual őeld experiment for a rep-
resentative population sample in Germany. The data from this experiment
exhibit high degrees of external validity between certain variables inside and
outside the experiment. In this sense the choice problem, despite its extreme
reduction, captures important real-life tradeoffs in őnancial markets. We also
őnd that households are remarkably unresponsive to shifts in returns.
The more detailed analysis also shows that the degree of external validity,
i.e., the extent to which our results help to predict actual stock market partic-
ipation, varies between different subgroups. External validity is stronger for
skilled and savvy subjects. We also observe that only these savvier subgroups
of subjects respond in a meaningful way to changes in incentives, highlight-
ing, once again, the important role of cognitive ability for even the simplest
of őnancial decision problems (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013). In our
setting less educated subjects forgo substantial additional earnings by not re-
sponding to exogenous shifts in investment incentives. Related to previous
studies on őnancial literacy (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) on retirement
savings, Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2013) on mortgage foreclosure and von
Gaudecker (2015) on portfolio diversiőcation), this difference addresses the
possibility of distributional effects that arise from cognitive differences. Sim-
ilar interventions to foster investments in real life (such as tax subsidies for
equity holdings) could have similar undesired effects. As before, we desire
to be careful in making too bold conclusions. We merely point out that our
evidence is consistent with such a role of complexity.
Adding further evidence to this, our separate experiment also őnds that as-
7 and 8, and biases the differences the test statistic towards zero.
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set complexity is a factor in this under-reaction to incentives. Even university
students, who compare favorably with the general population on proxies for
cognitive ability, react more strongly to shifts in the return of an asset with a
constant return than to shifts in an asset with a stochastic return when both
shifts are economically equivalent. To our knowledge, this is a phenomenon
that has not yet been documented in the literature on őnancial literacy, with
the exception of the related effects in Chetty et al. (2009) and Abeler and
Jäger (2015). This phenomenon raises questions for the psychology of arith-
metic (Ashcraft, 1992) and has potentially numerous applications in the realm
of economic decision makingÐthink about changing incentive structures in
deterministic vs stochastic environments. It raises also the general question to
what degree a lack of understanding contributes to our results, in particular
in the SOEP experiment. While it is hard to diagnose the presence of deep
or full understanding of the choice task, it appears clear that even some basic
understanding of the notion that earnings are tied to the return should lead to
some response to our return manipulations. Consequently, the problem that
we detect appears to relate fundamentally to the decision process and not only
to its inputs although, as discussed in deatil in Appendix E, understanding of
the environment does play some role for the rationality of choices.
For future research, our study may also inform the design of simple pilots
for interventions regarding őnancial investment of households. In particular, in
the light of the current underfunding of many pension systems (both pay as you
go and capital funded), greater stock market participation by the middle class
appears desirable to many economists and policy makers. Testing interventions
in artefactual őeld experiments such as ours might avoid costly mistakes.
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Historical benchmark for each treatment indicated by black horizontal lines.
Figure A1: Historical distribution of returns vs. the average distributions in
Lab and SOEP
Figure A1 compares the respondents’ beliefs about the fund’s return with
the true historical distribution of DAX returns. The őgure shows, in different
shades of gray and ordered from left to right within each bin, the őve different
distributions of beliefs for the őve different treatments. The őgure also com-
pares these distributions with őve corresponding true distributions, indicated
by black horizontal lines for each bin and treatment, that result from the true
historical distribution plus the őve shifters (in the same order, that is, from
-10 to the very left to +10 to the very right, within each bin). The őgure
shows that SOEP respondents are remarkably well calibrated. In none of the
seven bins are respondents off by more than 5 percentage points when data are
1
pooled across treatments. The largest two deviations are that the frequency of
small losses between 0 and 30% is slightly underestimated and the frequency
of larger losses is slightly overestimated. The good calibration can also be seen
in other metrics. While the mean return on the DAX from 1951 to 2010 was
15.5%, both the imputed and the stated expected return on the experimen-
tal asset of 12.5% and 8.3% respectivelyÐwhile lowerÐare at least similar in
magnitude to the historical mean. Moreover, while the relative frequency of a
positive return over these six decades was 70.0%, SOEP respondents thought
the DAX had seen a gain 69.3% of the time.38 In contrast, the average dis-
tribution of our student subjects in the lab (also shown in Figure A1) differs
signiőcantly from the historical benchmark in that too much probability mass
is assumed to be in the tails of the distribution.
Underneath the excellent calibration of the average SOEP respondent’s be-
lief lies, however, substantial heterogeneity in beliefs and miscalibration at the
individual level. Very few of the distributions provided by individual respon-
dents are close to the historical benchmark, and what produces the excellent
calibration in the aggregate is a mixture of respondents who put the entire
probability mass into a single bin and respondents who report diffuse distri-
butions.
That the return expectations we elicit show such remarkable calibration
stands in contrast to evidence from other countries, where substantial miscali-
bration is commonly observed. For the US Kézdi and Willis (2009) report that
HRS respondents expected a stock market gain with roughly 50% probability
in the 2002, 2004 and 2006 waves while the historical frequency of a gain on the
Dow Jones was 68%. Similarly, the probability of a gain larger than 10% was
estimated at 39% but the corresponding frequency was 49%. Dominitz and
Manski (2011) őnd similar numbers in the monthly surveys of the Michigan
38In order to predict whether subjects invest in the risky asset, a relevant question—
under expected utility, the only relevant question—is whether respondents expect a strictly
positive excess return, i.e. a mean return that exceeds 4%. Based on reported beliefs, the
proportion of respondents who expect a strictly positive excess return is 69.2% when using
stated beliefs, and 72.6% when using imputed beliefs. The historical frequency of the DAX
returning strictly more than 4% is 68.3%.
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Error bars are 95% confidence interval.
Figure A2: Average distributions of past and future returns
Survey of Consumers from mid-2002 to mid-2004. In the Netherlands, Hurd et
al. (2011) őnd that in 2004 the median expected rate of return on the Dutch
stock market index was a mere 0.3%, a severe underestimate of the historical
median return of 14%. A downward bias in expectations is by no means a
universal őnding, however. Respondents in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 waves of
the Survey of Economic Expectations reported expectations for the S&P500
that were substantially above the historical average, but also held the S&P500
to be more volatile than has been the case historically (Dominitz & Manski,
2011).
What explains these differences with the existing literature? One possible
explanation is that the papers quoted above compare respondents’ expecta-
tions about the future with returns realized in the past. A test for correct
calibration in this setting then amounts to a joint test of whether subjects
hold the historical distribution of returns to be identical to the distribution
3
of returns in the future and, if so, whether they have an accurate picture of
the historical distribution. In contrast, we elicit beliefs about the distribution
of returns over a well-deőned period of time in the past and can test for cal-
ibration without auxiliary assumptions. The beliefs that we elicit about the
next 12 months look, however, fairly similar, if somewhat more pessimistic ś
see Figure A2. This may not be entirely surprising as the survey period was
just after the economic crises in parts of Europe had reached their peak in-
tensity. In contrast to expectations about the past, where SOEP respondents
and students differed substantially (with the former being more realistic), we
őnd virtually identical expectations about the future between the two samples.
The mean imputed return is 12.5% while the probability of a gain on the DAX
is thought to be 58.8% on average. 51.8% of subjects state that they expect a
return that is higher than 4%.
4
B Equity Share and Beliefs – Regressions
Dependent Variable: Equity Share
SOEP: Stated Beliefs SOEP: Imputed Beliefs Lab: Stated Beliefs Lab: Imputed Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Imputed Expected Return 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Imputed Expected Return2 −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001)
Imputed Expected Return3 −0.00000∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Imputed S.D. of Return 0.001
(0.001)
Probability of a Gain −0.010
(0.037)
Stated Expected Return 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Stated Expected Return2 −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0002)
Stated Expected Return3 −0.00000 −0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 0.330∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.110) (0.011) (0.013) (0.110) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.037)
Personal Controls No No No No No No No No No No
N 562 562 560 562 562 560 198 198 198 198
R2 0.074 0.093 0.160 0.081 0.090 0.140 0.031 0.063 0.016 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.088 0.120 0.080 0.085 0.100 0.026 0.048 0.011 0.023
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Personal controls include dummy variables for gender, being born in the former GDR, having Abitur, having a university education, being employed,
having a high self-assessed őnancial literacy, owning stocks and for each level of our wealth proxy. They also include age and age2, household size,
the number of children in the household and household income
All standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust
Figure A3: Equity Share and Beliefs
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C Different results for different people
In this section we exploit the rich data set on the SOEP respondents in order
to study the role of socioeconomic background variables and direct measures
or plausible correlates of savviness. As described in Section 5, we őnd strong
differences between the SOEP sample and the university student sample re-
garding the extent to which they react to incentives. This raises the question
of whether there is other evidence that łsmartž, őnancially savvy respondents
react more strongly to variations in incentives. The following analysis conőrms
the existence of such differences.
We caution that our examination of heterogeneity in the SOEP sample is
a łőshing exercisež. However, its results are largely in line with what other
studies have documented before, namely the fundamental role of cognitive
ability for őnancial decisions making.
Table A2 documents treatment effects on choices and beliefs for different
subgroups. It shows that there are small subsamples of the population that do
react to incentives. For respondents with a university degree, the coefficients
indicate an increase in equity share of one percentage point per one percentage
point increase in return. Moving from the worst shifter of -10 to the best shifter
of +10, the equity share is predicted to increase by 20 percentage points. This
is similar to the effect we observe in the laboratory study with university
students where the equity share increases by 33 percentage points. Hence, it
appears that the main difference between SOEP and lab is driven by selection
on educational covariates.
The results for respondents with different wealth levels are somewhat mixed.
For reasons one can only speculate about, the strongest treatment effect is ob-
served for those who withhold information on income from interest. There is
also a notable composition effect between the two largest categories: respon-
dents with low but positive levels of income from interest are predicted to
increase their equity share by 14 percentage points when we move from the
worst to the best shifter. Those without any interest earnings are estimated
to exhibit a negative treatment effect.
Among the őnancial literacy questions we őnd a heterogeneous treatment
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Stock Market Participant
All Abitur University Degree Financially Literate
Equity Share 0.200∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 0.480 0.230∗∗
(0.064) (0.180) (0.300) (0.110)
Female −0.029 −0.120 −0.230 −0.049
(0.030) (0.110) (0.150) (0.052)
Born in East Germany −0.044 −0.021 −0.160 −0.083
(0.033) (0.120) (0.190) (0.061)
Age 0.004 −0.028 −0.062 0.002
(0.006) (0.023) (0.044) (0.011)
Age2 −0.0001 0.0003 0.001 −0.00004
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Abitur 0.150∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.058) (0.100)
University Degree −0.003 −0.002 −0.041
(0.072) (0.097) (0.120)
Household Size −0.004 0.036 0.045 −0.020
(0.022) (0.087) (0.110) (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.034 −0.015 −0.0003 0.048
(0.035) (0.110) (0.140) (0.059)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.058 −0.002 0.098 0.058
(0.043) (0.160) (0.240) (0.064)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.0003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003)
S.D. of DAX −0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain Probability of DAX 0.039 −0.051 −0.330 0.062
(0.085) (0.310) (0.480) (0.160)
Number of Children in Household −0.057∗ −0.110 −0.180 −0.062
(0.030) (0.110) (0.150) (0.049)
Employed −0.024 0.033 0.022 −0.007
(0.037) (0.120) (0.210) (0.067)
Financially Literate 0.080∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.200
(0.031) (0.100) (0.150)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗ 0.047 −0.033 0.086
(0.033) (0.110) (0.170) (0.054)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.270 0.320∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.140) (0.220) (0.084)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.180) (0.240) (0.110)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗ 0.150 0.013 0.560∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.170) (0.300) (0.170)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150 0.350 0.046 0.260
(0.100) (0.250) (0.360) (0.170)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023 0.039 0.029 0.010
(0.018) (0.040) (0.059) (0.029)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗ 0.150 0.520 0.140
(0.084) (0.330) (0.560) (0.130)
Constant −0.130 0.580 1.400 −0.007
(0.140) (0.490) (0.910) (0.260)
N 560 122 72 283
R2 0.280 0.360 0.480 0.320
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.220 0.260 0.260
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust. Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases).
Moreover, a dummy variable is added to the regression which is 1 for the observations with missing household income.
“Financially Literate” is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very
good” with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix H.
Table A1: Stock market participation by subgroups
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effect only for the compound interest question. The other variables that might
capture őnancial literacy do not show signiőcant interactions with the experi-
mental treatment. While the results on őnancial literacy and wealth are a bit
patchy, overall a picture emerges that is familiar from the literature. Even rel-
atively simple investment tasks as the one we have implemented here appear to
be cognitively so complex that sensible responses to variations in parameters
are shown only by skilled and sophisticated subjects.
An inspection of the two right-hand columns of Table A2 reveals that when
it comes to belief manipulation no systematic patterns emerge. Only one of the
interactions is statistically signiőcantly different from zero, but only marginally
so.
Given that we can identify some subgroups that react better to incentives,
it is not far-fetched to presume that we might also be able to detect a stronger
external validity of investment levels for these groups. With less noise in
behavior inside and presumably outside the laboratory, the measured correla-
tions between the experimental equity share and stock market participation
may increase. Table A1 shows the regression-based conditional correlates of
stock market participation, separately for different subgroups. Indeed it is the
case that łsmarterž subsamples show stronger external validity.
8
Equity Share Imputed Expectation of
Fund
Stated Expectation of Fund
Mean Treatment Effect Mean Treatment Effect Mean Treatment Effect
Education
< University Degree 0.373 (0.011) 0.000 (0.002) 12.646 (0.922) 0.107 (0.139) 8.649 (0.815) 0.076 (0.113)
University Degree 0.349 (0.033) 0.010∗∗ (0.004) 11.426 (2.619) 0.325 (0.353) 5.586 (2.039) -0.115 (0.300)
Interest from Wealth
0 0.368 (0.017) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) 13.265 (1.572) 0.110 (0.224) 9.012 (1.597) 0.086 (0.214)
< 250 Euros 0.360 (0.019) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.003) 10.576 (1.344) 0.320 (0.207) 7.759 (1.113) 0.076 (0.163)
250 - 1.000 Euros 0.344 (0.027) 0.001 (0.004) 18.231 (1.758) -0.123 (0.297) 9.618 (1.569) -0.247 (0.301)
1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.422 (0.048) -0.005 (0.007) 13.582 (3.266) 0.501 (0.518) 7.783 (1.846) 0.011 (0.204)
> 2.500 Euros 0.382 (0.054) 0.004 (0.007) 7.830 (8.722) -0.653 (1.246) 5.481 (3.307) 0.206 (0.246)
refused to answer 0.339 (0.073) 0.015∗∗ (0.007) 1.971 (8.978) 0.558 (1.030) 3.353 (3.572) 0.543 (0.351)
Financial Literacy: self-assessed
’good’ or ’very good’ 0.360 (0.015) 0.002 (0.002) 14.064 (1.231) 0.287 (0.180) 8.047 (1.059) 0.153 (0.153)
’a little’ or ’not at all’ 0.381 (0.016) -0.001 (0.002) 11.052 (1.227) -0.001 (0.183) 8.479 (1.091) -0.056 (0.147)
Financial Literacy: compound interest
correct 0.384 (0.014) 0.004∗ (0.002) 13.066 (1.157) 0.177 (0.178) 8.741 (0.865) 0.080 (0.117)
incorrect 0.349 (0.018) -0.003 (0.003) 11.381 (1.415) 0.119 (0.190) 7.701 (1.431) 0.004 (0.213)
don’t know 0.365 (0.059) -0.003 (0.006) 15.608 (3.751) -0.161 (0.547) 8.560 (4.725) 0.005 (0.533)
Financial Literacy: volatility
correct 0.400 (0.047) -0.005 (0.007) 21.056 (4.591) -0.415 (0.664) 14.726 (4.607) -0.763 (0.640)
incorrect 0.372 (0.012) 0.001 (0.002) 11.938 (0.906) 0.161 (0.134) 7.911 (0.755) 0.084 (0.102)
don’t know 0.301 (0.041) 0.003 (0.006) 11.234 (3.342) 0.556 (0.439) 4.944 (3.744) 0.980∗ (0.561)
Stock Owner
yes 0.448 (0.028) -0.002 (0.004) 12.828 (1.756) -0.054 (0.308) 9.280 (1.417) -0.439∗ (0.237)
no 0.353 (0.011) 0.002 (0.002) 12.483 (0.992) 0.185 (0.142) 8.099 (0.878) 0.157 (0.118)
The table shows the results of multivariate regressions in which, for each set of rows, the outcome variables in the columns are regressed on indicator variables for the different
levels of the row variables and a variable for the size of the shifter interacted with the different levels of the row variables. “Mean” and “Treatment Effect” therefore correspond
to the constants and slope coefficients in bivariate regressions of the column variables on each of the different levels of the row variables. Standard errors for OLS regressions are
Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust.
Table A2: Treatment effect by subgroups
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Table A3 describes (experimental) equity share of SOEP respondents and
uses an indicator explanatory variable łinterestž, deőned as one if the interest
from wealth is positive and zero otherwise (after deletion of missing values).
This indicator is interacted with the treatment variable. The coefficients show
that introducing this interaction does not change the results for participants
with university degree. In contrast, for participants without a university de-
gree, we őnd that those without interest earnings have a negative reaction to
the treatment while those with positive interest earnings show an insigniő-
cantly positive reaction.
Equity share












Adjusted R2 0.089 0.021
Residual Std. Error 0.260 (df = 42) 0.240 (df = 331)
F Statistic 2.500∗ (df = 3; 42) 3.400∗∗ (df = 3; 331)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression of Equity Share on Treatment Effect, Interest on wealth, and its interaction term. Results are presented for
individuals from the SOEP with and without university degree.
Table A3: Treatment effect by subgroups with heterogeneity in interest
Table A4 shows the regression results for őnancial literacy (instead of łin-
terestž) interacted with the treatment variable. More precisely, we use an in-
dicator łFinancially Literatež that is one whenever the respondent states that
he/she is either łgoodž or łvery goodž with őnancial matters and zero other-
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wise. In contrast to the results presented in Table A3, we can now compare
SOEP respondents and lab participants as őnancial literacy is also available for
the latter. From Table A4 we see that those with a combination of university
degree and high őnancial literacy show the highest reaction to the treatment
among the SOEP participants. Those without university degree show no effect,
irrespective of their degree of őnancial literacy. Finally, the lab participants
show the highest degree of reaction on treatment while the interaction term
with őnancial literacy appears to be irrelevant.
Equity share
SOEP with uni SOEP without uni Lab
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.005 −0.001 0.017∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Financial Lit. −0.013 −0.022 0.074
(0.068) (0.023) (0.050)
Treatment*Financial Lit. 0.007 0.002 −0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 0.350∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.017) (0.021)
Observations 72 488 196
R2 0.069 0.003 0.300
Adjusted R2 0.028 −0.004 0.290
Residual Std. Error 0.280 (df = 68) 0.250 (df = 484) 0.260 (df = 192)
F Statistic 1.700 (df = 3; 68) 0.430 (df = 3; 484) 28.000∗∗∗ (df = 3; 192)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression of Equity Share on Treatment Effect, financial literacy, and its interaction term. Results are presented for
individuals from the SOEP with and without university degree and individuals from the laboratory sample.
Table A4: Treatment effect by subgroups with heterogeneity in őnancial
literacy
In Table A5, we depict the regression results for stock ownership interacted
again with the treatment variable. For the SOEP participants with university
degree we see that the interaction term is statistically irrelevant.
11
Equity share












Adjusted R2 0.110 0.014
Residual Std. Error 0.270 (df = 68) 0.250 (df = 485)
F Statistic 3.800∗∗ (df = 3; 68) 3.300∗∗ (df = 3; 485)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression of Equity Share on Treatment Effect, Stock ownership, and its interaction term. Results are presented for
individuals from the SOEP with and without university degree.




As a proxy variable for measurement error we compute the difference between
actual and imputed beliefs and rank individuals according to the absolute
value of it. We emphasize that the ranking is performed for SOEP and Lab


















Figure A4: Correlogram as in Figure 2 but with “low measurement error”–
individuals only.
First, we consider the case of low measurement error, i.e., we only include
individuals with a measurement error proxy variable below the őrst quartile.
Second, we analyze the high measurement error case, which contains those
individuals only with a measurement error proxy variable above the third
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quartile.
Figure A4 depicts a correlogram for individuals with low measurement
error. We generated the correlogram with back of the envelope calculations
reported in Section 4 for the subset of respondents whose measurement error
in beliefs is small. The results show mild but insigniőcant changes in the
expected directions.
Equity share
SOEP Lab SOEP Lab
low ME low ME high ME high ME
Treatment 0.004 0.009∗∗ 0.002 0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.360∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.042) (0.020) (0.040)
Observations 162 50 142 50
R2 0.009 0.098 0.003 0.280
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.079 −0.004 0.260
Res. Std. Err. 0.250 (df=160) 0.290 (df = 48) 0.240 (df=140) 0.260 (df = 48)
F Statistic 1.50 (df=1;160) 5.20∗∗ (df=1;48) 0.49 (df=1;140) 18.00∗∗∗ (df=1;48)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A6: Regression of equity share on treatment for different subgroups of
measurement error (ME), i.e., ordered absolute distance between actual and imputed
beliefs is below first (low) or above third (high) quartile.
For different subgroups of ranked individuals, Table A6 depicts the esti-
mated effect of treatment on the equity share. From this table we see that for
SOEP participants we have positive but not signiőcant effects.
We further investigate the measurement error issue by analyzing alternative
ways to account for it. The following tables show results when measurement
error is estimated via the absolute difference between the mean of historical
DAX returns and the mean of imputed and stated beliefs. In the following, we
refer to individuals with low measurement error this ordered absolute distance
is below the őrst quartile and to individuals with high measurement error if it
is above the third quartile.
Table A7 depicts the estimation results for regressing equity share on treat-
ment for different measurement error groups. Again we see that for SOEP
individuals the treatment effect is positive but not signiőcant.
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Equity share
SOEP Lab SOEP Lab
low ME low ME high ME high ME
Treatment 0.004 0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.015∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 0.420∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.037) (0.021) (0.048)
Observations 142 50 141 51
R2 0.014 0.094 0.005 0.220
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.079 −0.003 0.200
Res. Std. Err. 0.240 (df = 140) 0.240 (df = 48) 0.240 (df = 139) 0.270 (df = 49)
F Statistic 2.00(df=1;140) 5.00∗∗(df=1;48) 0.64(df=1;=139) 14.00∗∗∗(df=1;49)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A7: Regression of equity share on treatment for different subgroups of
measurement error (ME), i.e., ordered absolute distance between mean of historical




Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Female 700 0.480 0.500 0 1
Age 700 53.000 17.000 16 94
Born in Germany 700 0.860 0.350 0 1
Born in the GDR 700 0.200 0.400 0 1
Abitur 700 0.200 0.400 0 1
University degree 700 0.120 0.330 0 1
Employed 700 0.500 0.500 0 1
Household Size 700 2.300 1.200 1 8
Number of Children in Household 700 0.360 0.780 0 6
Monthly Household Income (in 1000s of Euros) 652 2.500 1.500 0.100 12.000
Risk Tolerance 700 4.900 2.500 0 10
Financial Literacy (self-assessed: ’good’ or ’very good’) 697 0.500 0.500 0 1
Financial Literacy (compound interest question correct) 690 0.580 0.490 0 1
Financial Literacy (volatility question correct) 690 0.840 0.370 0 1
Equity share (in experiment) 562 0.370 0.260 0.000 1.000
Imputed expectation of fund 562 13.000 21.000 −80.000 110.000
Stated expectation of fund 562 8.300 18.000 −80.000 95.000
Gain Probability of Fund 562 0.690 0.280 0.000 1.000
Imputed expectation of DAX 562 5.500 18.000 −60.000 90.000
Gain Probability of DAX 562 0.590 0.330 0.000 1.000
Total Liquid Assets 515 19.000 44.000 0.000 446.000
Stock Market Participation 693 0.180 0.390 0 1
Stocks (amount) 671 1,780.000 7,874.000 0 110,000
Stocks / Total Liquid Assets 452 0.066 0.190 0.000 1.000
Total Debt 666 17,174.000 54,514.000 0 800,000
N is the number of non-missing observations
Table A8: Descriptive statistics for the 700 heads of household in SOEP
sample
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F Imputation of Moments
To derive various summary statistics from the elicited belief distributions we
őt continuous distributions to the raw data and calculate the statistics from
these distributions.
While much of the existing literature őts parametric distributions we fol-
low an approach similar to Bellemare et al. (2012) and őt cubic interpolating
splines using an approach due to Forsythe, Malcolm, and Moler (1977). We
őrst cumulate the probabilities that respondents place within each of the seven
bins. This yields 8 points on the cumulative distribution function from which
the responses were generated. We take these 8 points to be the knots of the
spline (that is, we ignore any rounding in the response and assume that the
CDF at these points is known) and interpolate between them with a piecewise
cubic polynomial.
Since each of the 7 pieces is deőned by four polynomial coefficients this is
a problem with 28 unknowns. The condition that the spline must go through
each of the 8 points gives 14 equations (one each for the end-points and two
each for the interior knots) and further assuming that the spline is twice contin-
uously differentiable at each of the knots yields 12 additional equations. What
pins down the spline are two boundary conditions, which are found by őtting
exact cubics through the four points closest to each boundary and imposing
the third derivatives of these cubics at the end-points on the spline.
What is problematic about using such a spline to impute a CDF is that
nothing in the procedure described above guarantees that the resulting spline
is monotonic. To overcome this problem we apply a őlter to the spline that
is due to Hyman (1983). The őlter relaxes some of the smoothness conditions
enough to ensure monotonicity.39
Figure A5 demonstrates the őt for six representative respondents. Circles
show the raw cumulative probabilities to which both the Hyman-őltered cubic
splines as well as various alternative distributions are őtted. By construction
the splines are extremely close to the data in all cases ś often much closer than
39Both the Forsythe et al. construction of the spline as well as the Hyman filter are im-
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Figure A5: CDFs derived from the belief data using both spline interpolation
and parametric distributions őt via least squares
any of the parametric distributions that have been őt to the data by minimizing
the sum of squared deviations at the 8 points. The two distributions on the
left are single-peaked and have non-zero probability in several bins and for
these cases all of the methods yield roughly the same őt. The distributions in
the middle have mass only in a single or in two of the bins, which is a problem
for the parametric distributions because in such cases the őt can be improved
ad inőnitum by reducing the variance of the distribution and thereby reducing
the sum of squared deviations at the 8 points. In the two cases on the right
the distribution is multi-modal, which naturally leads to terrible őt for the
parametric distributions, all of which are unimodal. The splines, in contrast
make no such assumptions and therefore őt even these cases rather well.
Finally, we calculate both the mean and the standard deviation from these
distributions numerically using adaptive Gauss-Kronrod quadrature.
18











































































































































































































































































































































Figure A6: 24 randomly chosen belief distributions from both the SOEP and
the lab sample.
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A Instructions – SOEP study (original German)
Einwilligung zur Teilnahme
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem łFinanzentscheidungsexperimentž teil-
zunehmen.
Sie können auf keinen Fall Geld verlieren!
Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am
Ende der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt.
O Finanzentscheidungsexperiment starten
O Möchte nicht teilnehmen
Einwilligung zur Teilnahme – Nachfrage
Das łFinanzentscheidungsexperimentž ist Teil der Befragung, bei dem Sie zu-
sätzlich einen Geldbetrag ausbezahlt bekommen. Sind Sie sicher, dass Sie nicht
teilnehmen wollen?
O Finanzentscheidungsexperiment doch starten
O Möchte nicht teilnehmen, weil: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Baseline – Schirm 1
Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.
Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.
Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:
1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins
von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text łBundesanlei-
hež genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text łFondsž genannt wird. Der
Gewinn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien
Index DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen
zusammenfasst.
Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Maßstab
tatsächlich bezahlen.
Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre
Entscheidung nachzudenken.
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Treatment – Schirm 1
Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.
Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.
Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:
1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins
von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text łBundesanlei-
hež genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text łFondsž genannt wird. Der
Gewinn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien
Index DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen
zusammenfasst.
Der Fonds schneidet entweder 5 Prozentpunkte besser oder 5 Prozentpunkte
schlechter ab als der DAX. Welche der beiden Möglichkeiten zutreffen wird,
erfahren Sie gleich.
Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Maßstab
tatsächlich bezahlen.
Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre
Entscheidung nachzudenken.
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Baseline – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesan-
leihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung
einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen,
benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre
1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum
aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten
Betrag geworden wäre.
Hier sehen Sie zwei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über
die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:
Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann machen Sie für jede 100 EUR,
die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 15 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann verlieren Sie für jede 100 EUR,
die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, 15 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch
Investitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zah-
len wir Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am
Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
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Treatment (minus) – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesan-
leihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung
einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen,
benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre
1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum
aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten
Betrag geworden wäre.
Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5
Prozentpunkte weniger erhalten.
Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts
über die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen: Wenn der DAX in dem
zufällig ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn
von 15% - 5% = 10%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 10 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust
von -15% - 5% = -20%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
in den Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -20 EUR.
• Einen Gewinn von +2% gemacht hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Ver-
lust von 2% - 5% = -3%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die
Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Verlust von -3 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch
Investitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zah-
len wir Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am
Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
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Treatment (plus) – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesan-
leihe und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung
einfach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
investieren einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen,
benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre
1951 bis 2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum
aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten
Betrag geworden wäre.
Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5
Prozentpunkte mehr erhalten.
Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über
die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:
Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn
von 15% + 5% = 20%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 20 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust
von -15% + 5% = -10%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die
Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -10 EUR.
• einen Verlust von -2% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn
von -2% + 5% = 3%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie
in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 3 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch In-
vestitionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen
wir Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für jede 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am
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Ende des Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
Baseline – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne
und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 erzielen kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in
den Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
Treatment (minus) – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne
und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, abzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte,
erzielen kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in
den Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Treatment (plus) – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne
und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, zuzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte,
erzielen kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in
den Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Baseline – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des
DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und





























Über den sieben Bereichen beőnden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Käst-
chen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häuőg Sie den Fonds
im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Berei-
chen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine
Häuőgkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie
es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden
Bereich erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so
bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der
Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie
einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr
wahrscheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen Ð bis zu 20 in einem Bereich Ð stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Treatment (minus) – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des
DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozent-
punkte unter dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und





























Über den sieben Bereichen beőnden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Käst-
chen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häuőg Sie den Fonds
im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Berei-
chen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine
Häuőgkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie
es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden
Bereich erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so
bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der
Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie
einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr
wahrscheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen Ð bis zu 20 in einem Bereich Ð stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Treatment (plus) – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des
DAX in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozent-
punkte über dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und





























Über den sieben Bereichen beőnden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Käst-
chen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häuőg Sie den Fonds
im jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Berei-
chen anklicken. Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine
Häuőgkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie
es halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden
Bereich erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so
bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der
Verlust oder Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie
einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr
wahrscheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen ś bis zu 20 in einem Bereich ś stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
12
Baseline – Schirm 5
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der
Wertveränderung des Fonds widerspiegeln. Beachten Sie dabei alle für Sie
denkbaren Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der historischen DAX-Entwicklung er-
geben.
Sollten Sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt Ihre Investitionsentscheidung noch einmal
ändern wollen, drücken Sie bitte auf łZurückž.






























Treatment (plus & minus) – Schirm 5
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der
Wertveränderung des Fonds widerspiegeln. Beachten Sie dabei alle für Sie
denkbaren Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der historischen DAX-Entwicklung und
dem (Aufschlag/Abschlag) von 5 Prozentpunkten ergeben.
Sollten Sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt Ihre Investitionsentscheidung noch einmal
ändern wollen, drücken Sie bitte auf łZurückž.






























Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 6
Geben Sie bitte außerdem an, welche durchschnittliche Wertveränderung (in
%) Sie für den Fonds erwarten.
→ Bitte maximal auf eine Stelle nach dem Komma eingeben (z.B. xx.x)!
→ Bitte Punkt anstatt Komma eingeben
Durchschnittliche Wertsteigerung . . . . . . . . .
oder
Durchschnittlicher Wertverlust: . . . . . . . . .
Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 7
Wir würden Ihnen nun gern ein paar Fragen zu dem soeben absolvierten Ex-
periment stellen.
Wie Sie diese Fragen beantworten wird keinen Einŕuss auf Ihre Auszahlung
haben.
Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des Fonds?
Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der ł0ž gar nicht sicher
und der Wert ł10ž sehr sicher bedeutet.
Mit den Werten zwischen ł0ž und ł10ž können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.
Gar nicht sicher O O O O O O O O O O O Sehr sicher
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Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 8
Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen
Gewinn von 40% gemacht hat, so wirft auch der Ihnen angebotene Fonds
einen Gewinn von 40% ab.
O wahr
O falsch
Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen





Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 9
Nachdem es in den bisherigen Fragen um die Entwicklung eines an den DAX
gekoppelten Fonds in der Vergangenheit ging wüssten wir nun gern, was Sie
für die zukünftige Entwicklung des DAX selbst erwarten. Geben Sie auf dem
nächsten Bildschirm an, wo Sie den DAX in einem Jahr sehen, ausgedrückt in
Gewinn oder Verlust gegenüber dem heutigen Wert. Wir fassen dazu erneut die
möglichen Gewinne und Verluste in die sieben größeren Bereiche zusammen.
Wir bitten Sie auch hier, alle für Sie denkbaren Entwicklungen des DAX in
Betracht zu ziehen.
Zeigen Sie uns dann an, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie die jeweiligen Gewinne und
Verluste halten.
Bitte drücken Sie dies aus, indem Sie wieder die 20 Kästchen markieren.
Ein Kästchen steht hier wieder für eine Häuőgkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns für wie wahrscheinlich Sie
die Wertveränderung des DAX, in einem Jahr, in einem der sieben Bereiche
halten.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so
bringen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass die Wert-
veränderung des DAX nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie
die Wertveränderung des DAX in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht
sehr wahrscheinlich.
• Mehr Kästchen ś bis zu 20 in einem Bereich ś stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 10
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der
DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verlust in den nächsten 12 Monaten, also bis zum
19.11.2013 widerspiegeln.






























Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 11
Außerdem interessiert uns auch hier, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung
des DAX sind.
Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des DAX?
Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der ł0ž gar nicht sicher
und der Wert ł10ž sehr sicher bedeutet.
Mit den Werten zwischen ł0ž und ł10ž können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.
Gar nicht sicher O O O O O O O O O O O Sehr sicher
Baseline & Treatment – Auszahlungsübersicht
Der Computer hat per Zufall das Jahr 1975 ausgewählt.
In diesem Jahr hat der DAX einen Gewinn von 41.21%,
und der Fonds somit einen Gewinn von 36.21% gemacht.
Wir zahlen Ihnen deshalb auf Basis Ihrer Investition 31 EUR aus, die sich wie
folgt berechnen:
Anlage Investition Gewinn/Verlust Auszahlung
Bundesanleihe 20000 EUR 4,0% 20800 EUR






Das Finanzentscheidungsexperiment ist nun zu Ende
⇒ Der Auszahlungsbetrag wird am Ende des Interviews nochmal angezeigt!
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B Instructions – SOEP study (English translation)
Agreement to Participate
In the following we kindly ask you to take part in a łőnancial decision experi-
mentž.
You cannot possibly lose any money!
Depending on the decisions you will make and some random factors you will,
however, receive some actual money at the end of the survey.
O Start the őnancial decision experiment
O I do not want to participate
Agreement to Participate – Second Take
The łőnancial decision experimentž is a part of this survey in which you can
earn some money. Are you sure that you do not want to participate?
O I have changed my mind: Start the őnancial decision experiment
O I do not want to participate because: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Baseline – Screen 1
We offer you an investment opportunity.
Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.
You can distribute this amount between the following investments:
1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%.
We will call this asset the łBundž henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the łfundž. The gains and losses on
this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is
a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.
We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.
Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your
decision.
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Treatment – Screen 1
We offer you an investment opportunity.
Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.
You can distribute this amount between the following investments:
1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%.
We will call this asset the łBundž henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the łfundž. The gains and losses on
this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is
a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.
The return of the fund will be either 5 percentage points higher or 5 percentage
points lower than that of the DAX. You will őnd out which of these two
possibilities applies to you soon.
We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.
Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your
decision.
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Baseline – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We
will then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100
EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure
proőt of 4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical
DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly
choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how
your investment would have fared.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the
actual performance of the DAX:
If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, you would have earned 15 EUR for each 100 EUR
invested in fund.
• a loss of -15%, you would have lost 15 EUR for each 100 EUR invested
in fund.
Your total proőt will be the sum of the proőts of your investments in both
Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At
the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Treatment (minus) – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We
will then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100
EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure
proőt of 4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical
DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly
choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how
your investment would have fared.
Additionally the computer has determined through a random
draw that you will receive 5 percentage points less.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the
actual performance of the DAX:
If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of 15%-5%=10%. This
means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 10 EUR.
• a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of -15%-5%=-20%. This
means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 20 EUR.
• a gain of +2%, then the fund would make a loss of 2%-5%=-3%. This
means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 3 EUR.
Your total proőt will be the sum of the proőts of your investments in both
Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At
the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We
will then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100
EUR you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure
proőt of 4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical
DAX gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly
choose a year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how
your investment would have fared.
Additionally the computer has determined through a random
draw that you will receive 5 percentage points more.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the
actual performance of the DAX:
If the DAX of the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of 15%+5%=20%. This
means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 20 EUR.
• a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of -15%+5%=-10%. This
means that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 10 EUR.
• a loss of -2%, the fund would make a gain of -2%+5%=3%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 3 EUR.
Your total proőt will be the sum of the proőts of your investments in both
Bund and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At
the end of the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Baseline – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can
produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how
much do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
Treatment (minus) – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can
produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010,
minus the 5 percentage points.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how
much do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can
produce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010, plus
the 5 percentage points.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how
much do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Baseline – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s
possible payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into






















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges.
Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in
each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty
boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your
fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range,
this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in
this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or
gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -ś up to 20 in one range ś imply correspondingly higher
probabilities.
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Treatment (minus) – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points below
the outcome that the DAX would have payed in one of these years.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s
possible payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into






















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges.
Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in
each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty
boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your
fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range,
this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in
this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or
gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -ś up to 20 in one range ś imply correspondingly higher
probabilities.
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points above
the outcome that the DAX would have payed in one of these years.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s
possible payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into






















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges.
Please indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in
each range by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty
boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your
fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range,
this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in
this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or
gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -ś up to 20 in one range ś imply correspondingly higher
probabilities.
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Baseline – Screen 5
Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reŕect your assessment of the de-
velopment of the fund. Please consider every Ð in your opinion Ð possible
historical DAX development.
If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please
click the button łBackž.























Treatment (plus & minus) – Screen 5
Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reŕect your assessment of the de-
velopment of the fund. Please consider every Ð in your opinion Ð possible
combination of the historical DAX development and the (addition/deduction)
of 5 percentage points.
If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please
click the button łBackž.























Baseline & Treatment – Screen 6
Please also let us know what average return (lit : łchange in valuež) (in %) you
expect for the fund.
→ Please use a maximum of one decimal! (e.g. xx.x)
→ Please use a decimal point instead of a comma
Average increase in value . . . . . . . . .
or
Average decrease in value: . . . . . . . . .
Baseline & Treatment – Screen 7
We would like to ask you some questions about the experiment which you have
just completed.
Your answers to these questions will not inŕuence your payment.
How confident are you in your assessment of the fund?
Please answer according to the following scale, in which ł0ž means łnot at all
conődentž and the value ł10ž means łvery conődentž.
With the values between ł0ž and ł10ž you can grade your opinion.
Not at all conődent O O O O O O O O O O O Very conődent
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Baseline & Treatment – Screen 8
True or false? If the DAX made a gain of 40% in the randomly chosen year,
the fund you have been offered would also make a gain of 40%.
O true
O false
True or false? If the DAX made a loss of 4% in the randomly chosen year, the




Baseline & Treatment – Screen 9
The questions so far all concerned the development of a fund whose returns
were tied to the development of the DAX in the past. We would now like to ask
you some questions concerning your expectations for the future development
of the DAX itself. On the next screen, please let us know where you see the
DAX in one year, expressed as a gain or loss relative to its current value. We
will again group the possible gains and losses into seven larger ranges.
Again we ask you to consider all of the developments of the DAX that you
believe are possible. Please indicate how likely you think the different proőts
and losses to be. Please express this by again marking 20 boxes. As before,
one box stands for a frequency of 1 out of 20, i.e. 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you consider the change in
value of the DAX in one year to lie in each of the 7 ranges
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range,
this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will not lie in this
range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or
gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -Ð up to 20 in one range Ð imply correspondingly higher
probabilities.
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Baseline & Treatment – Screen 10
Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of
the DAX-proőts and DAX-losses in the next 12 months, i.e. until 19.11.2013.























Baseline & Treatment – Screen 11
Morevoer, we are interested in how sure you are about your assessment of the
DAX.
How conődent are you in your assessment of the DAX?
Please answer according to the following scale, in which ł0ž means łnot at all
conődentž and the value ł10ž means łvery conődentž.
With the values between ł0ž and ł10ž you can grade your opinion.
Not at all conődent O O O O O O O O O O O Very conődent
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Baseline & Treatment – Payout Overview
The Computer randomly chose the year 1975.
In this year the DAX incurred a proőt of 41.21%
which means that fund incurred a proőt of 36.21%
As a result, we will pay you 31 EUR based on your investment, according to
the following calculation:
Asset Invested Amount Gain/Loss Payment
Bundesanleihe 20.000 EUR 4.0% 20.800 EUR
Fonds 30.000 EUR 36.21% 40.863 EUR
Sum 61.663 EUR
Payment 30.83 EUR
Rounded up to the
next Euro
31 EUR
This concludes the őnancial decision experiment.
⇒ The amount of payment will reappear on the screen at the end of the inter-
view.
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C Instructions – Complexity Study (original German)
Willkommens-Schirm
Willkommen!
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem Finanzentscheidungsexperiment teilzu-
nehmen.
Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am
Ende der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Sie können dabei
auf keinen Fall Geld verlieren.
Es ist wichtig, dass Sie während des Experiments still bleiben und nicht mit an-
deren Teilnehmern kommunizieren. Sollten Sie Fragen haben oder Hilfe brau-
chen, dann heben Sie bitte die Hand, und ein Experimentator wird zu Ihnen
kommen. Sollten Sie sich nicht an diese Anweisung halten, so müssen wir Sie
vom Experiment ausschließen. Vielen Dank.
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Schirm 1
Im Folgenden müssen Sie in 8 Runden jeweils eine Investitionsentscheidung
fällen. Alle Runden sind gleich aufgebaut. Eine der 8 Runden wird am Ende
des Experiments zufällig ausgewählt und Ihnen tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Wie
genau das passiert, dazu gleich gleich mehr.
Sie haben in jeder Runde jeweils eine Summe Geld zur Verfügung, die Sie
zwischen zwei Geldanlagen aufteilen müssen. Außerdem bekommen Sie jeweils
einen zusätzlichen festen Geldbetrag, unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung in
dieser Runde.
Eine der beiden Geldanlagen hat einen festen Zinssatz. Die andere Geldanlage
hat einen Zinssatz, der von der Entwicklung am Aktienmarkt abhängt. Dar-
über hinaus gibt es pro Runde auf jede der beiden Geldanlagen einen Bonus
(das heißt der Zinssatz wird um einen festen Betrag erhöht).
Die Geldanlage mit dem festen Zinssatz zahlt in jeder Runde 2% Zinsertrag
zuzüglich des Bonus. Diese Geldanlage wird im weiteren Text łBundesanleihež
genannt. Die andere Geldanlage orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index
DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen zusammen-
fasst. Um die Verzinsung dieser Geldanlage festzustellen, benutzen wir histori-
sche DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, und addieren
den entsprechenden Bonus hinzu. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus
diesem Zeitraum aus und berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen




Ein Beispiel könnte wie folgt aussehen. Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie auf
Bundesanleihe und Fonds aufteilen müssen und eine Auszahlung von 14.000
Euro, die Sie unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung bekommen. Auf den Zins der
Bundesanleihe erhalten Sie einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten, auf den Zins
des Fonds erhalten Sie ebenfalls einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten.
Konkret bedeutet das in diesem Beispiel, dass Sie für den Betrag, den Sie in
die Bundesanleihe investieren, einen Zins von 5% erhalten: die stets gleichen
2% zuzüglich des in dieser Runde relevanten Bonus von 3%. Sie machen also
für jede 100 Euro, die Sie in die Bundesanleihe investiert haben, einen Gewinn
von 5 Euro, und bekommen am Ende 105 Euro ausgezahlt. Die Verzinsung des
in den Fonds investierten Betrags wird in diesem Beispiel wie folgt bestimmt:
Sie ist die realisierte Kursentwicklung des DAX in einem zufällig gezogenen
Jahr (aus 1951 bis 2010) plus der Bonus von 3
• Hat also der DAX zum Beispiel in dem zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen
Gewinn von 3,5% gemacht, erhalten Sie auf den Betrag, den Sie in den
Fonds investiert haben, eine Verzinsung von 6,5%. Sie machen also für
jede 100 Euro, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von
6,50 Euro, und bekommen am Ende 106,50 Euro ausgezahlt.
• Hat der DAX dagegen im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Gewinn von 12%
gemacht, erhalten Sie auf Ihren investierten Betrag eine Verzinsung von
15% (mit 115 Euro Auszahlung pro 100 Euro Investition).
• Hat der DAX im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Verlust von 12% gemacht,
so erhalten Sie eine negative Verzinsung, die aber wegen dem Bonus um
3% geringer ist, also ein Verlust von 9%. In diesem Fall würden Sie für
jede 100 Euro Investition eine Auszahlung von 91 Euro bekommen.
Ihre Gesamtauszahlung ergibt sich in diesem Beispiel als 14.000 Euro (die
feste Auszahlung) plus die verzinste Investition in die Bundesanleihe plus die
verzinste Investition in den Fonds.
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Bitte beachten Sie, dass der Bonus auf die Bundesanleihe sich später vom
Bonus auf den Fonds unterscheiden wird. Sie sind nur in diesem Beispiel gleich
hoch gewählt.
(Das Beispiel ist natürlich willkürlich und sagt nichts über die tatsächliche
Entwicklung des DAX oder über andere unbekannten Größen aus.)
Schirm 3
Die Gesamtauszahlung zahlen wir Ihnen für eine der 8 Runden im kleineren
Maßstab aus. Das heißt, der Computer wählt am Ende des Experiments zufällig
eine der 8 Runden aus. Dabei hat jede Runde die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit,
ausgewählt zu werden. Diese Runde wird Ihnen in bar ausbezahlt.
Zusätzlich zieht der Computer ebenso zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrschein-
lichkeit ein Jahr aus dem Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010. Der Gewinn oder Verlust
des DAX in diesem Jahr wird dann herangezogen, um Ihre Auszahlung zu
bestimmen.
Für je 5000 Euro, die Sie in der Runde als Gesamtauszahlung bekommen,
erhalten Sie 1 Euro in bar.
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also eine Verzinsung von 2% zu-
züglich des entsprechenden Bonus ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung
jeden der DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 zuzüglich




Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie zwischen der Bundesanleihe und dem Fonds
aufteilen müssen. Unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung erhalten Sie zusätzlich
einen Betrag von 17.550 Euro.
Für die Bundesanleihe gibt es einen Bonus von 2,80 Prozentpunkten.












Prozentpunkte Prozentpunkte Euro Euro
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in
den Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass beide Beträge ganze Zahlen sind und zusammen
genau 50.000 EUR ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Verzinsung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX
in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie
die Gewinne und Verluste des DAX in diesem Zeitraum einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Gewinne und





























Über den sieben Bereichen beőnden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Käst-
chen. Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häuőg Sie den DAX im
jeweiligen Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästchen über den sieben Berei-
chen anklicken.
Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häuőgkeit von
1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns Einschätzung darüber, wie
häuőg der DAX in den Jahren 1951-2010 einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem
entsprechenden Bereich erzielt, an.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar kein Kästchen, so brin-
gen Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust
oder Gewinn des DAX nie in diesem Bereich lag.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie
einen Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr
wahrscheinlich.




Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der
Wertveränderung des DAX im Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010 widerspiegeln.































Das war’s. Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
Der Computer hat per Zufall bestimmt, dass Ihnen ihre Investition aus Runde
6 ausbezahlt wird. In dieser Runde haben Sie 25.000 EUR in die Bundesan-
leihe und 25.000 EUR in den DAX investiert. Der Bonus auf den Zins der
Bundesanleihe betrug in dieser Runde 3,00 Prozentpunkte, der Bonus auf den
DAX betrug 6,05 Prozentpunkte.
Der Computer hat außerdem per Zufall das Jahr 1992 ausgewählt. In diesem
Jahr hat der DAX einen Verlust von 0,66% gemacht.










Bundesanleihe 25.000 EUR 2 % 3,00 % 5,00 % 26.250 EUR













Bitte bleiben Sie noch einen Moment sitzen. Sobald die große Mehrzahl der
Teilnehmer das Experiment abgeschlossen hat, werden wir mit der Auszahlung
beginnen.
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D Instructions – Complexity Study (English translation)
Welcome Screen
Welcome!
In the following, we kindly ask you to take part in a őnancial decision experi-
ment.
Depending on your decision and some random factors, you will receive an
amount of money for real at the end of the experiment. You cannot possibly
lose any money.
It is important that you remain silent throughout the experiment and that you
do not communicate with other participants. Should you have any questions
or need any help, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
you. If you do not follow these instructions, we will have to exclude you from
the experiment. Thank you very much.
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Screen 1
In the following you have to make one investment decision in each of 8 rounds.
All rounds are constructed in the same way. At the end of the experiment one
of the 8 rounds will be randomly selected and the money earned in this round
will be your payment. We will tell you more about the exact way this works
shortly.
In each round you will have a certain amount of money, which you must
distribute among two őnancial assets. Furthermore, in each round you will
receive an additional őxed amount of money that you will receive independent
of what your investment decision is.
One of the two őnancial assets offers a őxed rate of interest. The other asset
has an interest rate which depends on the development of the stock market.
In addition there will be a bonus applied to both assets (i.e. the interest rate
will be increased by a őxed amount).
The investment possibility with the őxed interest rate pays 2% plus the bonus
in each round. We will call this asset the łBundž in the following text. The
other őnancial asset will be based on the German stock market index DAX,
which is a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enter-
prises. To determine the return on this investment, we use historical DAX-
proőts and DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010 and then add the bonus.
The computer randomly chooses a year in this period and calculates for this




An example could be as follows. Imagine that you have 50,000 Euros, which
you must distribute over Bund and fund, as well as a payment of 14,000 Euros
that you receive independent of your investment decision. You receive a 3
percentage points bonus on the interest of the Bund, and a 3 percentage points
bonus on the interest of the fund.
Concretely for this example, that means that you would receive an interest of
5% for the amount invested in the Bund: the usual 2% plus the relevant bonus
of 3% for this round. For each 100 Euros invested in the Bund, you earn 5
Euros, and are paid 105 euros at the end. The interest of the amount invested
in the fund is calculated as follows: It will be the realized return of the DAX
in one randomly chosen year (from 1951 to 2010) plus the bonus of 3%.
• If the DAX made a proőt of 3.5% in the randomly chosen year, you
would would get an interest rate of 6.5 % on the amount invested in the
fund. This means that you earn 6.50 Euros for each 100 Euros invested
in the fund and are paid 106.50 Euros at the end of the experiment.
• If, in contrast, the DAX made a gain of 12% in the randomly chosen
year, you would receive an interest rate of 15% on your investment (with
115 Euros earned for each 100 Euros of your investment).
• If, in the randomly chosen year, the DAX made a loss of 12%, you would
receive a negative interest rate, which however would be lower due to
the bonus of 3%, i.e. a loss of 9%. In this case you would earn 91 Euros
for each 100 euros invested.
In this example your complete payment would be made up of 14.000 Euros
(the őxed payment) plus the result of the investment in the Bund plus the
result of the investment in the fund.
Please note that the bonus on the Bund later may differ from the bonus on
the fund. They are merely equally high in this example.
(The example is of course arbitrary and does not contain information on the
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actual development of the DAX.)
Screen 3
You will receive the total payment of one of the 8 rounds on a smaller scale.
At the end of the experiment the computer will choose one of the 8 rounds at
random. Every round has the same probability of being chosen. This round
will be paid out in cash.
Moreover, the computer randomly chooses a year from 1951 to 2010, also with
equal probability. The gain or loss on the DAX in this year will be used to
determine your payment.
For every 5000 Euro that you obtain in this round you will receive 1 Euro in
cash.
To sum up: The Bund yields an interest of 2% plus the corresponding bonus
while the fund can yield every DAX-proőt or DAX-loss of the years 1951 to




You have 50,000 Euros which you have to distribute over the Bund and the
fund. In addition, you will receive 17,550 Euros independent of your choice.
For the Bund, the bonus is 2.80 percentage points.














How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how
much do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that both amounts are integers and sum up to exactly 50,000
EUR.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Screen 4
As you know, the return on the fund depends on the development of the DAX
in the years from 1951 to 2010. In the following, we want to ask you what you
think the DAX’s gains and losses were during this period of time.
Therefore we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund in seven






















On the next screen there are 20 boxes above each of these seven ranges. Please
show us for the seven ranges how often you expect the DAX to have been in
each range by clicking the mentioned boxes.
Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20,
i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your
fund will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range,
this will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in
this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or
gain in this range to be possible, but not very likely.




Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of
the DAX in the years from 1951 to 2010.
























That’s it. Thank you for participating!
The computer has determined by random draw that you will receive your
investment of round 6. In this round you invested 25,000 EUR in the Bund
and 25,000 EUR in the DAX. In this round the bonus on the interest rate of
the Bund was 3.00 percentage points, and the bonus on the DAX was 6.05
percentage points.
Moreover, the computer has randomly chosen the year 1992. In this year the
DAX made a loss of 0.66%.




Gain / Loss Bonus Overall
Gain/ Loss
Payoff
Bund 25,000 EUR 2 % 3.00 % 5.00 % 26,250 EUR











Please remain seated for a little while. We will start the payment as soon as
the vast majority of participants has completed the experiment.
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E Decision Screen in Complexity Experiment
Figure S1: Decision Screen
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F Histogram Belief Elicitation Screen
Figure S2: Belief elicitation screen
G Equity share by treatment
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SOEP Lab






















Figure S3: Equity Share by Treatment
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H Variable Description and Coding
The full data set contains 1146 respondents in 700 households. Since asset al-
location is commonly seen in the literature as the result of joint optimization
of all household members we narrow the sample to the 700 heads of house-
hold, which we identify as the respondents who őlled out the SOEP household
questionnaire. All demographics whose coding is detailed below are the demo-
graphics of this household head.
Abitur
Germany has a multi-track educational system in which only students who
graduate from high school with an łAbiturž diploma are automatically allowed
to enroll at university. In the SOEP respondents are asked directly for the
highest secondary school degree they have obtained and our Abitur variable
is coded mainly according to the answer to this question. There is one special
case, however, that requires special attention. 59 respondents obtained their
secondary education outside of Germany and a separate question gives too
little information to be able to map the secondary education they obtained into
the German educational system precisely. Of these subjects, 11 have university
degrees, however; education for which, had it been obtained in Germany, the
Abitur would almost always be a prerequisite. Since we are interested in
the Abitur as a proxy for higher ability and higher education and foreign
respondents with university degrees plausibly posses the same higher ability
and higher education we recode these subjects as having Abitur.
Born in East Germany
This indicator variable is 1 if the respondent was born in the German Demo-
cratic Republic. It is 0 for respondents born in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, those born outside of Germany and those born in East Germany after
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reuniőcation in 1990 (14 cases).
Interest from Wealth
This variable is our main proxy for respondents’ liquid wealth holdings. Though
our survey module included detailed questions about more speciőc asset classes,
item non-response rates for the questions asking for the invested amounts were
fairly high. The household questionnaire also included the question łHow large,
all in all, was your income from interest, dividend payments and capital gains
in 2011ž, with six answer categories.40 For the econometric analysis we gen-
erate a variable that uses information from both questions. We create a new
category for subjects who report that their capital income was precisely zero,
sort all respondents who gave exact answers into the six categories above and
then merged the highest three categories into a single category for capital in-
comes above e2500 to increase the cell count (counts before the merge were
20 for the e2500 to e5000 category, 5 for the e5000 to e10000 category and
5 for the more than e10000 category). Lastly, we added a category for all
subjects who refused to answer both questions.
Financial Literacy
We assess respondents’ őnancial literacy in two different ways. First, we ask
people to self-assess their őnancial literacy with the question:
łHow good, all in all, are you with financial matters?ž41
• very good
40In German: “Wie hoch waren, alles in allem, die Einnahmen aus Zinsen, Dividenden
und Gewinnen aus allen Ihren Wertanlagen im Jahr 2011?”. Many respondents were either
unwilling or unable to provide a precise answer to this question. In a follow-up question they
were therefore asked to estimate the amount and choose between 6 categories: below e250,
e250 to e1000, e1000 to e2500, e2500 to e5000, e5000 to e10000, more than e10000
41In German: “Wie gut kennen Sie sich alles in allem in finanziellen Angelegenheiten aus?




• not at all
Second, we ask two questions that explicitly test respondents’ őnancial literacy:
łSuppose you have e100 in a savings account. You receive 20% on
this amount per year and leave the money in the account for 5 years.
How much money will be in the account after these 5 years?ž42.
• more than e200
• exactly e200
• less than e200
• don’t want to answer
łWhich of the following types of investments has the largest fluctu-
ations in returns over time?ž43.
• savings accounts
• őxed income securities
• stocks
• don’t want to answer
Liquid assets
All household members are asked about individual holdings of the following
asset types:
42In German: “Angenommen, Sie haben 100 eGuthaben auf Ihrem Sparkonto. Dieses
Guthaben wird mit 20% pro Jahr verzinst, und Sie lassen es 5 Jahre auf diesem Konto. Wie
viel Guthaben weist Ihr Sparkonto nach 5 Jahren auf?”
43In German: “Was glauben Sie: Welche der folgenden Anlageformen zeigt im Laufe





3. call deposit accounts (łTagesgeldž)
4. őxed deposits
5. covered bonds, municipal bonds, bank bonds, corporate bonds or sovereign
bonds
6. stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible bonds (łAktien-
anleihenž)
7. real estate funds
8. bond and money market funds
9. other funds
10. other securities
For each of these types, respondents are őrst asked whether they own any assets
of that type at all and, if the question is answered affirmatively, about the size
of the asset holdings. Respondents are instructed to estimate this amount
should they be unable to provide an exact őgure. We code a household as
participating in the stock market if the head of household answers the question
about stock market mutual funds, individual stocks and reverse convertible
bonds with łyesž.
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I Check for measurement error using understanding test
In this subsection, we make use of understanding questions provided to the
SOEP participants, which are the following:
1. If, in a randomly chosen year, the DAX increases by 40% then also the
fund has a proőt of 40%.
2. If, in a randomly chosen year, the DAX increases/decreases by X% then
also the fund chosen by you has a proőt of Y%.
We consider two subgroups. First, the individuals with łlow understandingž
who provide correct answers to up to one question. Second, the individuals
with łhigh understandingž that answer both questions correctly. In the fol-
lowing, we estimate for each subgroup the effect of treatment on the equity
share.
Equity share







Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.031
Residual Std. Error 0.260 (df = 364) 0.250 (df = 171)
F Statistic 1.100 (df = 1; 364) 6.400∗∗ (df = 1; 171)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table S1: Regression of equity share on treatment for different subgroups of un-
derstanding.
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J Comparison of belief measures
Stated beliefs vs. imputed beliefs using Hyman spline:
SOEP Lab























Spearman rank correlation in the SOEP sample: 0.43 Spearman rank correla-
tion in the lab sample: 0.47
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Stated beliefs vs. assuming mass is uniformly distributed within bin:
SOEP Lab


























Spearman rank correlation in the SOEP sample: 0.43 Spearman rank correla-
tion in the lab sample: 0.47
64
Stated beliefs vs. the mode of the histogram (that is, we assume that the
expectation is the midpoint of the bin into which subjects place the largest
number of blocks. If multiple bins have the same, maximal number of blocks
we average the midpoints):
SOEP Lab





















Spearman rank correlation in the SOEP sample: 0.45 Spearman rank correla-
tion in the lab sample: 0.44
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K Robustness Check – Predicting real-world stock-market participation – alter-
native wealth measures, alternative specifications
Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participant
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Share 0.220∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.068) (0.064) (0.066) (0.076) (0.056)
Female −0.043 −0.029 −0.028 −0.028 −0.016
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Born in East Germany −0.058∗ −0.044 −0.032 −0.021 −0.079∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.00004 −0.0001 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000)
Abitur 0.200∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.065) (0.044)
University Degree 0.049 −0.003 0.013 −0.014 −0.021
(0.078) (0.072) (0.074) (0.083) (0.052)
Household Size 0.039∗∗ −0.004 0.003 0.013 0.003
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.019)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.020 0.034 0.033 0.020 0.017
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.008 0.058 0.052 0.058 0.068
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.001 0.0003 0.0005 −0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
S.D. of DAX −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX −0.003 0.039 0.035 0.096 0.003
(0.088) (0.085) (0.081) (0.096) (0.083)
Number of Children in Household −0.096∗∗∗ −0.057∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Employed −0.015 −0.024 −0.030 −0.006 −0.015
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039)
Financially Literate 0.140∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.046)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.047)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.058)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.069)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150 0.170∗
(0.100) (0.090)
Total Liquid Assets (missing=0) 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
Total Liquid Assets2 (missing=0) −0.0001∗∗
(0.00003)
Total Liquid Assets3 (missing=0) 0.00000
(0.00000)
Total Liquid Assets: missing 0.130∗∗∗
(0.040)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023 0.032∗ 0.020∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.082) (0.069)
Total Liquid Assets 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Total Liquid Assets2 −0.0001∗∗
(0.00003)




Constant 0.110∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.130 −0.100 −0.210
(0.029) (0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.140)
N 561 560 560 560 417 560
R2 0.021 0.150 0.280 0.290 0.310
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Income and Liquid assets are in thousands of Euros. Standard errors for OLS regressions are Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard errors for probit marginal effects via bootstrap with 1000 replications.
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6.059.10 6.053.109.00 2.65 5.905.90
3.006.05 9.006.055.90 5.90 9.152.80







Point size is proportional to the number of overlapping observations.
Figure S4: Raw Data in Complexity Experiment
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